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Originalism Talk: A Legal History 
Mary Ziegler* 
Progressives have long recognized the tremendous political appeal of 
originalism. For many scholars, originalism appears to have succeeded 
because it achieves results consistent with conservative values but 
promises judicial neutrality to the public. By drawing on new historical 
research on anti-abortion constitutionalism, this Article argues for a 
radically different understanding of the originalist ascendancy. 
Contrary to what we often think, conservative social movements at 
times made significant sacrifices in joining an originalist coalition. 
These costs were built in to what this Article calls originalism talk—the 
use of arguments, terms, and objectives associated with conservative 
originalism. 
Scholars have documented the costs confronted by social movements 
reliant on rights-based rhetoric, particularly when activists seek social 
change in the courts. Originalism talk was similarly constraining. By 
becoming part of an originalist coalition, abortion opponents increased 
their influence over the selection of federal judicial nominees. At the 
same time, in stressing originalist rhetoric, abortion opponents had to 
publically mute their longstanding constitutional commitments 
involving the right to life, the personhood of the fetus, and the existence 
of rights based in natural law or human-rights principles. 
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers insight into 
progressive attempts to create a doctrinally satisfying and politically 
resonant alternative to conservative originalism. Often the issue is how 
to create an interpretive method that accomplishes as much as 
originalism: advancing progressive constitutional beliefs while 
appealing to the public’s interest in the rule of law. As this Article shows, 
however, it is not clear that the benefits of belonging to the originalist 
coalition outweigh its costs. 
 
* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns, Weaver, Miller Professor of Law at Florida State University 
College of Law. She would like to thank Caitlin Borgmann, Al Brophy, Deborah Dinner, Joel 
Goldstein, Roger Goldman, Sophia Lee, Serena Mayeri, Eric Miller, Martha Minow, Karen 
Tani, and Anders Walker for sharing their thoughts on the research and writing of earlier drafts 
of the article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Progressives have long recognized the tremendous political 
appeal of originalism.1 To a significant extent, the progressive 
constitutional project has been an effort to identify the salient 
features of popular originalism and to create an equally resonant and 
popular progressive alternative.2 Generally, the story goes, 
conservative originalism was a political success because it offered a 
perfect fit between conservative ends and a seemingly impartial 
interpretive means.3 Understood in this way, originalism represents a 
perfectly subtle and seemingly innocuous strategy to introduce 
conservative values into American constitutional law. 
Drawing on new historical research on anti-abortion 
constitutionalism, this Article argues for a radically different 
understanding of the originalist ascendancy. For many of its 
constituents, belonging to the conservative originalist coalition 
involved a complex and painful set of tradeoffs—the sacrifice of 
cherished principles for immediate political gain. 
Viewed as a constitutional movement, the early anti-abortion 
cause enjoyed at best an ambiguous relationship with originalism. 
Originalism’s message of neutrality, respect for democratic values, 
and constitutional fidelity resonated with certain grassroots activists 
and academic commentators. However, in the late 1960s and early 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling 
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) (offering an empirical explanation of popular 
support for originalism); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 681 (2009); 
Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-first 
Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 241 (2007); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the 
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1529–38 (2011) 
(documenting “the rise of conservative originalism during the Reagan era and . . . its success in 
shaping the conversation about the Constitution”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Greene, Selling Originalism, supra note 1, at 661 (arguing “that an 
account of why originalism is successful is crucial to fundamentally non-originalist interpretive 
theories”); Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis?: Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the Constitution and 
the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1207–08 (2011). 
 3.  See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due 
Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 548 (2012); Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2012); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a 
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 572 (2006) 
(“Originalism is so powerfully appealing because conservatives have succeeded in fusing 
contemporary political concerns with authoritative constitutional narrative.”); Reva B. Siegel, 
Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 191, 201–36 (2008) (showing the rise of originalism as seen in the gun rights 
movement). 
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1970s, the anti-abortion movement—a key part of a later originalist 
coalition—defended a constitutional agenda based on the 
Declaration of Independence, human rights law, substantive due 
process precedents, biological evidence, and common-law opinions 
on fetal personhood.4 This agenda enjoyed broad lay support across 
otherwise divided grassroots groups. 
When anti-abortion constitutionalism took its place as part of a 
broader conservative constitutional agenda, movement leaders acted 
as much for strategic as for substantive reasons. In the early years of 
Ronald Reagan’s first term, administration attorneys helped to 
transform originalism into a political practice—an effort “to forge a 
vibrant connection between the Constitution and contemporary 
conservative values.”5 Becoming part of the originalist coalition 
allowed abortion opponents to influence the selection of judicial 
nominees and to increase the chances that Roe v. Wade would be 
overruled.6 However, conservative originalism promised far less than 
the constitutional change abortion opponents had demanded. For 
decades, abortion opponents had fought to establish a right to life 
that would be protected from the vicissitudes of ordinary politics. At 
most, an originalist court would return the abortion issue to the 
states—an outcome long dreaded by anti-abortion 
constitutionalists.7 
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers an important 
new perspective on historical and theoretical works on originalism. 
Historians convincingly describe how originalism functions as a 
political practice. In short, the argument goes, social movements 
gravitate toward originalism because originalism articulates values 
that activists share and promises outcomes that movements want. 
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism shows instead that 
social movements at times made significant sacrifices in joining an 
originalist coalition. These costs were built in to what this Article 
calls “originalism talk”—the use of arguments, reasoning, and 
objectives associated with first-generation originalism. 
 
 4.  These strategies are discussed in infra Part II. 
 5.  Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 569. 
 6.  On the influence of originalism on federal judicial nominations, see, e.g., Jamal 
Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 72 (2009); Peter J. Smith & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 
743–44 (2011). 
 7.  See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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Scholars have documented the costs confronted by social 
movements reliant on rights-based rhetoric, particularly when activists 
sought social change in the courts.8 Originalism talk required similar 
tradeoffs. Originalist rhetoric helped rally members disheartened by 
the movement’s lack of progress. It reformulated demands for social 
change in a way that seemed part of a respectable legal tradition. 
Originalism talk allowed abortion opponents to “raise consciousness, 
fundraise, and bargain with state decision makers.”9 At the same time, 
in stressing originalist rhetoric, abortion opponents had to publically 
mute their longstanding constitutional commitments involving the 
right to life, the personhood of the fetus, and the existence of rights 
based in natural law or human rights principles. 
As Tomiko Brown-Nagin argues, the “hallmark” of effective 
social movement activism is an effort “to directly influence public 
policy by appealing directly to the public and a target audience of 
decisionmakers, such as governmental representatives.”10 Social 
movements succeed when they influence public attitudes and raise 
 
 8.  For an overview of this body of work, see, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: 
An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1862 (1987); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and 
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 369–74 
(2012); Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 713, 714–15, 719–21 (2011). Much of the scholarship on rights talk draws on 
Stuart Scheingold’s work, demonstrating that rights claims were a political resource similar to 
“money, numbers, status, and so forth.” STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 7 (2d ed. 2004). Some scholars argue 
that rights reasoning can empower social movements, helping them to “raise [public] 
consciousness, fundraise, and bargain with state decision makers.” Douglas NeJaime, The Legal 
Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 668 (2012). For works in this vein, see, e.g., 
FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN 
MODERN AMERICA (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2007); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT 
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2006); Deborah Dinner, The 
Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist 
Activism, 1966–1974, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577, 580 (2010). Other scholars stress the 
constraints imposed by rights talk. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 74 (1987) (in the context of sex equality, 
describing the way in which such rhetoric “perfectly obscures these collective realities behind 
the mask of recognition of individual rights”); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY 
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 276–77 (1994); Mark 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); cf. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW 
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991) (explaining how rights talk 
both accommodated an existing social order and represented a kind of emancipatory discourse 
for labor activists). 
 9.  NeJaime, supra note 8, at 668. 
 10.  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1503 (2005). 
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the salience of the cause at issue.11 Originalism talk limited the anti-
abortion movement’s ability to undertake this work in two ways: 
First, by suppressing alternative claims, the movement’s allegiance to 
originalism limited the manner in which members could describe 
their grievances and goals.12 Second, by focusing activists’ efforts on 
interpretive methodology, originalism talk used up valuable resources 
that could have been directed to changing public attitudes.13 For its 
constituents, originalism involved difficult tradeoffs. Historians tell a 
far simpler story about the ways in which originalism served as a site 
of social-movement mobilization. This Article begins to recapture 
the complexity surrounding the creation of the originalist coalition. 
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism also makes an 
important contribution to the theoretical literature, offering insight 
into progressive attempts to create a convincing alternative to 
conservative originalism. Often, the issue is how to create an 
interpretive method that accomplishes as much as originalism: 
advancing progressive constitutional beliefs while appealing to the 
public’s interest in the rule of law. As this Article shows, however, it 
is not clear that the benefits of belonging to the originalist coalition 
outweigh its costs. We should study whether progressive social 
movements should forge an alternative to conservative originalism, 
not simply how they should do so. 
  
 
 11.  For a discussion of the relationship between social movements, public attitudes, and 
social change, see, e.g., PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 
NEW DEAL 90 (1998); JOSEPH E. LUDERS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE LOGIC 
OF SOCIAL CHANGE 200 (2010) (noting “a general congruence between public opinion and 
policy outcomes” in social-movement politics, particularly when there is “mass attentiveness”); 
LAURA L. TOUSSAINT, THE CONTEMPORARY US PEACE MOVEMENT 74 (2009) (arguing that 
“social control must . . . be viewed by the general public as illegitimate in order to facilitate 
broad-based support for [a social] movement”); S. LAUREL WELDON, PROTEST, POLICY, AND 
THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 186 
(2002) (contending that “[s]ocial movements are aimed primarily at social transformation” 
and work “by changing social meanings or values”). 
 12.  Cf. Mark Fathi Massoud, Do Victims of War Need International Law? Human 
Rights Education Programs in Authoritarian Sudan, 45 LAW &. SOC’Y REV. 1, 17 (2011) 
(explaining that “rights talk tends to narrow or limit the discursive resources available to civil 
society groups by suppressing alternative claims”).  
 13.  Similar criticisms have been made in discussing litigation as a tool for social change. 
See, e.g., Scott Barclay et al., Two Spinning Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements, 54 
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 11 (2011) (“When lawyers appear in social movement studies, they 
are mostly characterized as hired guns who exhaust a movement’s scarce resources . . . .”). 
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the Article in 
the existing literature on conservative constitutionalism and the pro-
life movement. To the extent that histories document the 
development of anti-abortion constitutionalism, scholars position it 
as part of a broader narrative about the rise of originalism. Part II 
begins to develop an alternative story about anti-abortion 
constitutionalism, focusing on the years between 1965 and 1981. 
The movement promoted a right to live based not on text, history, 
or the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, but rather on 
the Declaration of Independence and substantive due process. Part 
III charts the decline of this constitutional agenda in the 1980s as 
movement leaders identified practical reasons for endorsing the 
emerging originalist agenda. Part IV explores the stakes of this 
history, and Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
I. CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY 
For most historians and legal theorists, conservative originalism 
is a success story. Generally speaking, “[o]riginalism regards the 
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial 
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional 
interpretation in the present.”14 Irrespective of any of its flaws or 
doctrinal inconsistencies, conservative originalism apparently enjoys 
meaningful popular support while delivering the constitutional 
results its constituents desire. Scholars across the ideological 
spectrum work to explain how to preserve or duplicate the influence 
that conservative originalism now enjoys. As this Section shows, 
however, current scholarship largely misses the deep costs incurred 
by the movements that have joined the originalist political coalition. 
Studying anti-abortion constitutionalism allows us to recover the lost 
history of conservative originalism’s tradeoffs. 
Originalism often plays a part in larger histories of the political 
right. While the history of conservative constitutionalism remains 
understudied, a well-developed political history of the Republican 
Party and the grassroots Right has taken shape in recent decades.15 
 
 14.  Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 
(2004). 
 15.  On the history of the conservative movement, see, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, 
THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE POLITICAL HISTORY 
(2007); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW & NANCY MACLEAN, DEBATING THE AMERICAN 
CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT, 1945 TO PRESENT (2009); DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL 
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After World War II, some American scholars, activists, and politicians 
launched an attack on the progressive liberal order created during 
the rise of the New Deal.16 For decades, the triumph of this 
conservative movement may have seemed improbable. In the 1940s 
and 1950s, the movement was bitterly divided between moderates 
concerned about alienating Republican Party centrists and activists 
convinced that the Party had forsaken its principles.17 Grassroots 
advocates promoted strong positions on anti-communism and small 
government, while moderates urged their colleagues to back 
positions and candidates that would help the party win elections. 
Before the 1960s, as historian Donald Critchlow explains: 
Conservatism had found a voice in a small group of intellectuals, 
but its influence was limited intellectually and politically. A strident 
anti-Communism had gained popular acceptance among grassroots 
activists, but its fervor was never shared by the majority of 
Americans.18 
Some activists belonging to organizations like the John Birch 
Society, an ultra-right, anticommunist group, helped to fuel 
Democratic Party allegations that the Right was “racially prejudiced, 
xenophobic, and easily manipulated by demagogues . . . .”19 Even 
within the Republican Party, tensions between movement 
conservatives and party veterans were high.20 However, the failed 
nomination of conservative Barry Goldwater, a darling of those who 
despised the East Coast Republican Establishment, set the stage for 
later conservative successes.21 During the Goldwater campaign, 
 
OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A SHORT HISTORY (2010); KEVIN MATTSON, 
REBELS ALL!: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONSERVATIVE MIND IN POSTWAR AMERICA 
(2008); GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 
SINCE 1945 (3d ed. 2006); RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 
1970S (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008). 
 16.  See, e.g., CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15, at 55–57; George Schneider, 
The Old Right, in CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA SINCE 1930: A READER 5 (Gregory L. 
Schneider ed., 2003). 
 17.  On the divisions within the Republican Party in the 1940s and 1950s, see, e.g., 
MARY C. BRENNAN, TURNING RIGHT IN THE SIXTIES: THE CONSERVATIVE CAPTURE OF THE 
GOP 17 (1995); ROBERT MASON, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS FROM 
HOOVER TO REAGAN 132 (2012); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF 
THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT 115 (2001). 
 18.  CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15, at 40. 
 19.  Id. at 65. 
 20.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 21.  On the influence of Goldwater’s failure, see, e.g., J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF II, A 
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extremist activists channeled their efforts into grassroots political 
organizing, and after 1964, factional divisions gradually healed. 
Ronald Reagan’s landslide 1980 victory represented the culmination 
of a revolution in American politics, as Democrats and Republicans 
voted overwhelmingly for a man who symbolized many of the 
conservative movement’s beliefs.22 
If the political history of the conservative movement is well 
developed, much of its legal and constitutional history remains to be 
unearthed. We can understand conservative constitutionalism partly 
as a network of foundations, educational institutions, and elite 
organizations. Steven Teles’s path-breaking work in this vein frames 
legal conservatism partly as a system of influence.23 In this account, 
conservatives worked to gain control of elite institutions as a way of 
influencing the courts and creating a supply of lawyers and potential 
judges.24 Teles argues that legal mobilization took shape in response 
to the world created by liberal elites in the 1960s, a world that put a 
premium on knowledge and credentials.25 Other scholars have taken 
a similar approach, studying the cardinal traits of attorneys 
advocating for right-wing causes or the creation of elite conservative 
 
GLORIOUS DISASTER: BARRY GOLDWATER’S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT xii (2006) (“The organization that [was] created to win the 
Republican nomination for Barry Goldwater . . . and the conservative vision that attracted so 
many supporters came to represent a new baseline for the Republican Party . . . . [E]fforts to 
elect Barry Goldwater gave muscle to the embryonic conservative movement . . . .”); Gillian 
Peele, American Conservatism in Historical Perspective, in CRISIS OF CONSERVATISM?: THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT, & AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER BUSH 
15, 22 (Joel D. Aberbach & Gillian Peele eds., 2011) (arguing that Goldwater’s defeat 
“signaled that the right could capture the Republican party,” “dramatically broadened the 
conservative element in the Republican ranks,” and made disparate factions “into a unified 
movement”). 
 22.  See, e.g., JEFFREY HOWISON, RONALD REAGAN AND THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT xviii (2014) (“[T]he victory of Ronald Reagan [in 
1980] signaled the ascendancy of the conservative movement in American society”); Nancy 
MacLean, Guardians of Privileges, in CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15 at 162 (“[F]or 
conservative movement builders, [Reagan’s] 1980 election was an epochal victory”). 
 23.  Steven M. Teles, Conservative Mobilization Against Entrenched Liberalism, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF 
CONSERVATISM 160 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); STEVEN M. TELES, THE 
RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 
(2008) [hereinafter TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT]. 
 24.  See TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 
4, 6, 9–10, 13. 
 25.  See id. 
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institutions like the Federalist Society.26 These new institutions 
created important opportunities for debate. In this vibrant 
intellectual environment, the ideas of original intent (and later 
original meaning) took shape.27 
But as scholars recognize, conservative constitutionalism consists 
not only of a set of institutional arrangements but also a group of 
arguments.28 Current scholarship identifies some forms of originalism 
as the defining feature of recent conservative constitutional thought 
and political action.29 
The term originalism, of course, has a history of its own. While 
James Bradley Thayer had called for “judicial restraint” as early as 
1893,30 the promotion of a jurisprudence of original intent came 
later when, in the late 1960s and 1970s, conservative scholars 
developed powerful criticisms of the Warren Court. During the 1968 
presidential election, Richard Nixon promised to nominate “strict 
constructionists” who, in Nixon’s words, would “interpret the 
Constitution . . . [and] not twist or bend the Constitution in order 
to perpetuate his personal political and social views.”31 In 1971, 
when Nixon nominated William Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, 
the future Justice gave some content to the idea of strict 
constructionism, suggesting that judges should be limited by “the 
 
 26.  For further examples, see e.g., ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: 
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); George W. Hicks, Jr., The 
Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law School Student Body, 
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623 (2006). 
 27.  See, e.g., SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 124, 130 (describing groups, like the 
Heritage Foundation and the American Conservative Union, that favor a jurisprudence of 
original constitutional intent); TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, 
supra note 23, at 145. 
 28.  For analyses of the tenets of conservative constitutionalism, see, e.g., ROBIN WEST, 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
211–212 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the 
United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55–59 (2004); 
Johnsen, supra note 1, at 240. 
 29.  See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical 
Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 286 (2011) (“Two of the 
conservative intellectual movement’s central commitments make originalism its most 
compatible theory of constitutional interpretation.”); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative 
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 673 (1990) (“Judicial restraint and originalism 
constitute the core of a conservative theory of constitutional interpretation.”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 519, 522 (2012). 
 31.  Whittington, supra note 14, at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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language used by the framers, [and] the historical materials 
available . . . .”32 Throughout the 1970s, scholars like Robert Bork 
and Raoul Berger elaborated on the idea of a jurisprudence based on 
original intent.33 By the mid-1980s, with the selection of Edwin 
Meese III as attorney general, Reagan administration officials and 
scholars christened the interpretive method championed by Warren 
Court critics as “originalism.”34 
The kind of originalist thought pioneered in the 1970s and 
1980s has become known as first-generation conservative 
originalism.35 More recently, different schools of originalist theory 
have emerged: progressive, libertarian, and conservative, for 
example, or other theories based on original meaning versus original 
intent.36 Outside of the academy, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
explain, conservative originalism is both an interpretive method and 
a political practice.37 It is with this strand of originalist thought and 
practice that the history of anti-abortion constitutionalism intersects. 
 
 32.  Noms. of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary United States S., 92d Cong. 55 (1971) (Statement of William Rehnquist, 
S. Ct. nominee). 
 33.  See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 14, at 600–03. 
 34.  On coining of the term originalism and its embrace by Meese, see, e.g., id. at 599; 
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 145 
(suggesting that Meese “originated not the idea, but the nomenclature of original intent 
jurisprudence”). 
 35.  For uses of the term “first-generation” originalist, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for 
Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & 
Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009). 
 36.  Some commentators prioritize the original expected application of the relevant 
constitutional text. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 135 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758–72, 784–85 (2009). Other commentators focus 
on the original semantic meaning of the text, stated at the level of generality found in the text. 
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Whittington, 
supra note 14, at 599. On the difference between new and old originalism, see, e.g., Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714–16 (2011). Randy 
Barnett’s libertarian originalism is one variety of new originalism, see, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–130 (2004), as 
is Jack Balkin’s progressive originalism, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–4, 
14–16, 23–34 (2011). 
 37.  See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 3. 
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For progressives, the success of conservative originalism poses the 
most intriguing historical question. Many studies contend that first-
generation originalism is intellectually incoherent, based on the 
problematic concept of collective intention and on subjective and 
shallow “law office history,”38 but the success of conservative 
originalism outside of the academy matches any setbacks faced within 
it. Conservative originalist thought plays an important role in 
Supreme Court decision-making, federal judicial nominations, and 
conservative political mobilization.39 Popular support for conservative 
originalism appears to reflect some level of substantive support for its 
basic tenets.40 The issue, for progressives, is how to counter the 
surprising and persistent popularity of conservative originalism. 
Uncovering the secret of conservative originalism’s success 
requires an understanding of what it promises both grassroots 
activists and the general public. According to Robin West, 
“conservative constitutionalists view private or social normative 
authority as the legitimate and best source of guidance for state 
action” and see “both the Constitution and constitutional 
adjudication as a means of preserving and protecting that 
authority.”41 Erwin Chemerinsky identifies as defining traits of 
conservative constitutionalism a desire “to narrow . . . federal 
power . . . , to restrict access to the [federal] courts, . . . to expand [] 
aid to religion, . . . to limit the scope of individual rights, . . . [and to 
 
 38.  Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 
301 (2011) (suggesting that originalism relies on law office history); see also Laurence H. 
Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra 
note 36, at 68–72 (describing the impossibility of determining the level of abstraction at which 
constitutional clauses should be read and applied; Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial 
Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 101–02 (1999) 
(describing the failure of originalists to adhere to the original meaning of “commerce”); Post 
& Siegel, supra note 3, at 548–49 (“In recent decades, a large scholarly literature has 
developed that is dedicated to exposing the analytic inconsistencies and theoretical deficiencies 
of originalism.”); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s 
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 287 (2004) (describing “the vast body of 
primary historical materials . . . that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning” and the 
resulting failure of originalist methodology to restrain judicial interpretation). 
 39.  See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 545–46. 
 40.  See, e.g., Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, supra note 1, 
at 417. 
 41.  WEST, supra note 28, at 212. 
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limit the] scope of criminal defendants’ rights.”42 Dawn Johnsen 
summarizes conservative constitutional principles as follows: 
Judges should respect the rule of law. They should rule according 
to what the law says, not what they would prefer it to be. They 
should not legislate from the bench or impose their own social or 
political agenda. They should enforce the Constitution as written, 
including limits on federal power. . . . [These statements] have 
become the Right’s mantra . . . . Through decades of remarkable 
discipline and repetition, conservatives have imbued these carefully 
chosen, innocuous-sounding phrases with deeply contested and 
radical ideological content.43 
Generally, conservative social movements are thought to have 
gravitated toward originalism partly because it promised to deliver 
on their legal and social goals. As Katherine Bartlett explains: 
“originalism is less a coherent or compelling jurisprudence than a 
‘political practice’ that seeks ‘to forge a vibrant connection between 
the Constitution and contemporary conservative values.’”44 
Originalism is the quintessential conservative constitution project, 
since it “was tied to conservative political projects and cultural 
assumptions.”45 As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain: 
“[o]riginalism remains even now a powerful vehicle for conservative 
mobilization.”46  
For members of the public, originalism promised neutrality, 
objectivity, and fidelity to the country’s founding principles—values 
that would attract many who did not share the reform priorities of 
movement conservatives. In the words of Earl Maltz, it was “this 
potential for neutrality that account[ed] for the visceral appeal of 
originalism.”47 The failure of first-generation, conservative 
originalism in the academy makes all the more impressive the success 
of originalism in shaping the work of the Court and in retaining 
 
 42.  Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 55–57. 
 43.  Johnsen, supra note 1, at 240. 
 44.  Bartlett, supra note 3, at 548 (quoting Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 569). 
 45.  Greene, supra note 6, at 1689. 
 46.  Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 546. 
 47.  Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 794; see 
also Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions 
into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (“The appeal of originalism is that the moral 
principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American Republic . . . and not 
the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”). 
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popular support. As Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, and Stephen 
Ansolabehere have shown, public support for originalism “expresses 
a substantive legal, political, and cultural preference.”48 
In these accounts, conservative originalism has been a strategic 
triumph. Conservative originalism proved tremendously attractive to 
a general public interested in rule-of-law values. At the same time, 
originalism proved to be an important weapon of movement 
conservatives. In originalism, activists identified an interpretive 
strategy that would forward their political values. 
A careful study of groups composing the conservative originalist 
coalition paints a more complex picture. The coalition pro-lifers 
joined included a variety of movement organizations and actors, 
including those naturally attracted to originalism’s message of 
neutrality and constitutional fidelity. Others, like anti-abortion 
leaders did not endorse originalism because it reflected movement 
members’ deeply held constitutional principles. Nor did all the 
members of a conservative originalist coalition benefit equally from 
signing on to a new legal agenda. Instead, for abortion opponents, 
endorsing originalism represented a strategic, if ultimately 
unsatisfying, compromise. In this story, originalism was not simply a 
theory of interpretation or a sophisticated tactical move. Instead, 
originalism was a process of constitutional coalition-building with 
clear tradeoffs. 
Other historians have studied the rise, fall, and mysterious 
staying power of conservative originalism. This project is unique, 
however, in demonstrating how originalism talk constrained the 
social movements that adopted it. Scholars have long demonstrated 
how rights talk limits the ways in which social movements imagine, 
describe, and demand social change.49 Both rights talk and 
originalism talk are extraordinarily flexible, albeit in different ways. 
Because of the malleability of rights talk, grassroots movements can 
“endow rights with capacious political meanings as part of broad 
struggles for socioeconomic transformation.”50 Given that 
constitutional text and history can support many different 
interpretations, conservative originalism similarly allows movements 
to “infuse the law of the Constitution with [diverse] contemporary 
 
 48.  Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 1, at 417. 
 49.  See supra nn.8–9 and accompanying text. 
 50.  Dinner, supra note 8, at 580. 
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political meanings.”51 Moreover, both rights and originalism-based 
contentions have mobilized social movements to challenge the status 
quo in the courts.52 Like rights rhetoric, originalist arguments can 
affect every aspect of movement activity, as originalist rhetoric rallies 
activists during presidential elections, judicial nomination hearings, 
and litigation campaigns.53 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, originalism talk imposes unique 
constraints not associated with the more capacious form of rights 
talk. Whereas social movements have appealed to a rich and varied 
set of sources in demanding rights,54 originalist rhetoric identifies 
constitutional authenticity as authoritative.55 Originalist arguments 
do not easily allow movements to turn to human rights law, 
international law, natural law, or any other “unconventional” source 
of a demand for change.56 Moreover, it appears that, even outside of 
the courts, originalism talk has primarily mobilized social movements 
interested in change made through litigation. While movements 
using rights talk as part of a court-based strategy often find 
themselves constrained, social movements can, in other contexts, 
mold rights claims to reflect a wide variety of transformative 
demands.57 By contrast, even in the political arena, the originalist 
coalition mainly privileges the election of candidates and the 
nomination of judges sympathetic to a particular interpretation of 
the Constitution in the courts.58 For the most part, the end-game 
remains social change through litigation. 
 
 51.  Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560. 
 52.  On originalism’s mobilizing potential, see, e.g., id. at 559, 568. On the potential of 
rights talk to mobilize grassroots activists, see generally, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 8; 
MACLEAN, supra note 8; Dinner, supra note 8 (“[P]opular rights consciousness can mobilize 
social movements to challenge normative power structures.”). 
 53.  On the way in which originalism shapes different parts of the conservative 
movement strategy, see, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560–68. 
 54.  For example, as Kornbluh shows, the welfare-rights movement drew inspiration 
from civil-rights advocacy, human-rights rhetoric, and political critiques of capitalism in 
formulating its demands. See KORNBLUH, supra note 8, at 12, 49–50, 67, 175. For a similar 
use of a variety of sources of inspiration, see Dinner, supra note 8, at 590–95. 
 55.  See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560–61. 
 56.  For example, conservative originalists have often refrained from using international 
sources, even when doing so might have been advantageous. See, e.g., DAVID L. SLOSS, 
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, & WILLIAM S. DODGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 515 (2011). 
 57.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 58.  Cf., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 1203 (“Social conservative voters place a high enough 
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For this reason, originalism talk and rights talk have analogous 
costs and benefits, particularly when movements prioritize work in 
the courts. Originalist rhetoric allowed pro-lifers access to an 
influential coalition. It legitimated anti-abortion demands and 
framed them in a way that resonated with legal elites. At the same 
time, in order to fit within an existing originalist framework, 
abortion opponents had to downplay their most deeply held 
constitutional commitments. Instead of building support for their 
fundamental beliefs, abortion opponents turned to rhetoric that 
promised an immediate political payoff. 
Certainly, in the short term, irrespective of the strategy chosen, 
abortion opponents would not have achieved constitutional 
protection (or social support) for the fetal rights they championed. 
Nonetheless, originalism talk used up resources and energy that 
could have advanced activists’ efforts to reshape public attitudes 
toward fetal life. Historians have not fully captured what conservative 
originalism meant to its constituents. This Article recovers an 
important part of this lost history. 
Moreover, this Article offers new foundation for efforts to create 
a progressive alternative to originalism. To create such an alternative 
would in theory allow progressives to influence the courts, federal 
court nominations, and popular attitudes as much as conservative 
originalism. As the Article shows, however, the conservative 
originalist alliance emerged at considerable cost to some of its 
members. The success of originalism as a political practice depended 
on the willingness of social movements to set aside important beliefs 
and goals in order to forge a politically influential alliance. 
II. MAKING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVE, 1965–1981 
Early anti-abortion constitutionalism could not easily be 
reconciled with the jurisprudence of original intent articulated by 
William Rehnquist, Robert Bork, and other first-generation 
originalists. These scholars demanded fidelity to the intentions of the 
framers and heavy reliance on the text of the Constitution.59 Those 
 
priority on the federal courts to make credible to politicians the threat that their votes could 
turn on that issue.”). 
 59.  On the history of first-generation originalism, see, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism 
and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 
2003–05 (2012); Whittington, supra note 14, at 599–603. 
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who would later be seen as pioneering originalists attacked the 
freewheeling Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of the 1960s 
and 1970s that some commentators perceived as identifying 
fundamental rights to birth control or reproductive liberty without 
any obvious constitutional foundation.60 Anti-abortion 
constitutionalists instead demanded that the courts recognize 
another implicit right—a right to life—by relying on unconventional 
legal sources. Contrary to what we might now expect of 
conservatives, abortion opponents envisioned a broad role for the 
judiciary and the State, and they endorsed a variety of unorthodox 
interpretive methods. The anti-abortion movement followed earlier 
social movements, like the antislavery campaign of the 1840s and 
1850s, in turning to the Declaration of Independence to illuminate 
the meaning of the Constitution.61 Moreover, in the 1960s and 
1970s, the anti-abortion movement joined the pro-choice and 
welfare-rights movements, among others, in relying on an expansive 
vision of substantive due process, procedural due process, or state 
action.62 
In the mid-1960s, anti-abortion constitutionalists assumed that 
the public would automatically support the right to life if they 
understood what abortion really was. For this reason, early anti-
abortion constitutional theories served primarily as a vehicle for 
evidence of the personhood of the fetus. Relying predominantly on 
equal-protection or procedural due process reasoning, early anti-
abortion constitutionalism assumed the existence of a fundamental 
right to life without explaining its precise constitutional foundation. 
Gradually, as the abortion-rights movement made headway in the 
lower courts, abortion opponents began to elaborate more fully on 
their constitutional beliefs. 
 
 60.  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 405, 409–10 (2d ed. 1997) (attacking the Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts for discounting original intent); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 
(1971) (arguing that Brown lacked a basis in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 61.  On abolitionists’ use of the Declaration of Independence, see, e.g., HENRIETTA 
BUCKMASTER, LET MY PEOPLE GO: THE STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE ABOLITION MOVEMENT 31 (1992); ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF 
AMERICAN FREEDOM 86 (1999). 
 62.  This Section later explores these parallels in greater depth. 
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A. The Creation of Anti-abortion Constitutionalism, 1965–1973 
The contemporary anti-abortion movement emerged in response 
to efforts to reform or repeal bans on abortion in the 1960s and 
1970s.63 Because anti-abortion organizations depended on the 
conditions present in each state, groups adopted strikingly different 
tactics, beliefs, and priorities.64 The movement found itself divided 
about substantive issues, like contraception and the Equal Rights 
Amendment, as well as tactical questions.65 Just the same, elite and 
grassroots members of what was a fragmented movement shared 
profound constitutional convictions about the existence of a right to 
life. As attorneys initially framed many of the movement’s 
constitutional arguments, movement lay persons and physicians 
enthusiastically adopted them. 
Scholars have debated the source of these convictions, whether 
they stem from faith in traditionalist gender roles, subconscious 
disgust, or religious commitments.66 It is not my purpose here to 
explain the origin of anti-abortion constitutional convictions. Just 
the same, it is worth taking these beliefs seriously. Abortion 
opponents framed their beliefs and goals in constitutional terms 
before the Supreme Court intervened in the debate.67 This 
 
 63.  See, e.g., Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and 
Strategies, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 139 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1996). 
 64.  See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL 
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 292 (1992). 
 65.  On anti-abortion divisions about contraception and the Equal Rights Amendment, 
see, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v. 
Wade, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 574–76, 584–90 (2012). On the movement’s tactical 
divisions, see, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 138–43. 
 66.  For an argument showing subconscious disgust motivated some abortion 
opponents, see, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 409 (2013). For an explanation of the relationship between opposition to abortion and 
endorsement of a traditionalist vision of gender roles, see, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION 
AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 117–18, 199–201, 205 (1984). For an argument that 
some abortion opponents acted out of a sense of religious obligation, see, e.g., MICHAEL W. 
CUNEO, THE SMOKE OF SATAN: CONSERVATIVE AND TRADITIONALIST DISSENT IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 64–66 (1999); Michael W. Cuneo, Life Battles: 
The Rise of Catholic Militancy within the American Pro-Life Movement, in BEING RIGHT: 
CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 270–75, 284 (Mary Jo Weaver & R. Scott Appleby 
eds., 1995). 
 67.  For examples of the use of constitutional arguments in the mid-1960s, see, e.g., 
William J. Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATH. LAW. 200, 201–03 (1963); Robert M. Byrn, 
Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (1966) [hereinafter Abortion in 
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constitutional framing began at a time when supporters of legal 
abortion described their own cause as one involving public health 
and population control as well as constitutional rights.68 Moreover, 
abortion opponents continued to insist on the existence of a right to 
life long after it seemed possible to create any constitutional 
protection for the fetus.69 The constitutionalism of the anti-abortion 
movement may reflect quite different subconscious motivations, but 
movement members’ constitutional commitments have been 
remarkably consistent, persistent, and passionately promoted. 
As early as the mid-1960s, non-lawyers in many pro-life groups, 
like many social movement members, used constitutional rhetoric to 
express their shared aspirations.70 Groups chose names that referred 
to the “right to life” mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, 
including the Southern California Right to Life League, New York 
State Right to Life, and the Illinois Right to Life Committee.71 
Constitutional commitments defined the statements of purpose of 
several major pro-life organizations, including the National Right to 
Life Committee (NRLC), the largest national pro-life organization; 
American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL), a moderate pro-life 
group; and Americans United for Life (AUL), the group that would 
form the nation’s leading pro-life public law firm. “Protecting the 
 
Perspective]; Note, In Defense of the Right to Live: The Constitutionality of Therapeutic Abortion, 
1 GA. L. REV. 693, 697–700 (1967). 
 68.  On the turn of the abortion-rights movement to the courts and to constitutional 
law in the late 1960s, see, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 335–473 (1998). 
 69.  While there appears to be no chance for ratification in the near term, abortion 
opponents continue to push for an endorsement of a fetal-rights amendment in the Republican 
Party platform. See, e.g., Sean Sullivan, Republicans, Democrats spar over abortion language in 
GOP platform, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/08/26/republicans-democrats-spar-over-abortion-language-in-
gop-platform/. 
 70.  For an articulation of this view of movements’ use of constitutional rhetoric, see, 
e.g., Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”, 
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987). This Section later discusses at greater length pro-lifers reliance 
on constitutional discourse. 
 71.  On the naming of the Right to Life League of Southern California and New York 
State Right to Life, see, e.g., Fred C. Shapiro, ‘Right to Life’ has a message for New York State 
legislators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1972, at SM10. On the early activity of the Right to Life 
League of Southern California, see, e.g., Keith Monroe, How California’s Abortion Law Isn’t 
Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1968, at SM10. On the founding of the Illinois Right to Life 
Committee, see, e.g., SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: 
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 35 (1991). 
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right to life of the unborn child,” the NRLC Statement of Purpose 
asserted, “is a central issue to the National Right to Life 
Committee.”72 A strategy memo drafted by ACCL leaders William 
Hunt and Joseph Lampe argued: “Our fundamental legal documents 
list life as an unalienable right.”73 The AUL’s Declaration of Purpose 
similarly explained: 
We believe, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, that 
“all men are created equal”; and thus that to be true to its heritage, 
this nation must guarantee to the least and most disadvantaged 
among us an equal share in the right to life.74 
The anti-abortion movement emphasized constitutional 
arguments before the opposition did so. The movement to repeal 
bans on abortion made progress in state legislatures in the early 
1960s, with Colorado, California, Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Georgia loosening bans on abortion before 1969.75 In promoting 
these laws, abortion-rights advocates framed abortion as both an 
important medical procedure and the solution to an epidemic of 
botched, back-alley procedures.76 Supporters of reform laws like the 
one in Colorado emphasized that abortion “was strictly a health 
matter.”77 
In the 1960s, abortion opponents began to argue that these 
reform laws violated the Constitution. The attorneys who framed 
these constitutional claims played a vital role in the development of 
the movement. In the early years of its existence, movement 
leadership was surprisingly egalitarian, putting professionals and 
blue-collar activists, and men and women, in positions of equal 
 
 72. Statement of Purpose from National Right to Life Committee (1972) (on file with 
the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich., The American Citizens Concerned for 
Life Papers, Box 4). 
 73. Memorandum from William C. Hunt & Joseph A. Lampe on Strategy 
Considerations for ACCL Involvement in Abortion and Related Issues 1–5 (1974), (on file 
with the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich., The American Citizens Concerned 
for Life Papers, Box 15). 
 74. Declaration of Purpose from Americans United for Life, (1971), (on file with the 
Concordia Seminary, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, St. Louis, Missouri, the Executive File). 
 75.  See, e.g., RAYMOND TATALOVICH, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38 (1997). 
 76.  See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the 
Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 281, 282 (2009). 
 77.  GARROW, supra note 68, at 324. 
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authority.78 Attorneys were among the movement’s leadership, but 
their influence reached beyond the formal role they played in the 
hierarchy. These lawyers formulated constitutional arguments that 
were to become the centerpiece of movement commitments, and 
attorneys helped to develop the legal strategies the movement would 
pursue both before and after Roe. 
For example, Thomas L. Shaffer, a professor at Notre Dame, 
argued that abortion reform deprived the fetus of life without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. “If human 
life is involved, though, [in abortion],” Shaffer explained, “its 
destruction is a relatively grave matter. Abortion should at least, in 
that case, be surrounded with procedural protections as great as 
those given men convicted of [a] crime . . . .”79 
While insisting that legal abortion violated the rights of the fetus, 
abortion opponents generally attributed liberalization bills to public 
ignorance about the nature of fetal personhood. As Shaffer 
explained: “the decision . . . to leave the life or death of unborn 
children in the hands of physicians and pregnant women [has] 
come . . . with too little consideration of the possibility that 
[abortion] involves millions of human lives.”80 
In the mid-1960s, anti-abortion activists viewed constitutional 
arguments as a way of popularizing their views about the fetus. In a 
1965 article, Robert Byrn, a professor at Fordham School of Law, 
summarized a common view of the movement’s mission: “The task, 
then, is to bring the public to a realization of the fact that pre-natal 
life is innocent human life and, like all such life, is inherently 
sacred.”81 By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had already 
developed an equal-protection jurisprudence targeting discrimination 
 
 78.  For example, New York State Right to Life counted among its leaders a law 
professor, a construction worker, and a homemaker. See Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM 
34. Other state organizations, like Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, had a similarly 
diverse leadership, including supporters of family planning like Frederick Mecklenburg, an 
obstetrician-gynecologist, and his wife, Marjory, a home economics teacher and mother. See, 
e.g., Pennsylvanians Concerned for Life, “Biographies of Persons Attending Conference of 
National Importance in Right to Life Work” (n. d., c. 1972), in THE AMERICAN CITIZENS 
CONCERNED FOR LIFE PAPERS, BOX 4, 1972 NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE CONVENTION FILE. 
See also DONALD CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, ABORTION, 
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 137–38 (1999). 
 79.  Thomas L. Shaffer, Abortion, the Law, and Human Life, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 94, 106 
(1967–1968). 
 80.  Id. at 95. 
 81.  Byrn, supra note 67, at 322. 
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on the basis of race and national origin.82 The Court treated laws 
that classified on these bases as inherently suspect and subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny.83 An equal-protection argument used by 
anti-abortion activists compared fetuses to other discrete and insular 
minorities—fetuses were defenseless, subject to discrimination (in the 
form of abortion), and defined by a trait (age or residence in the 
womb) over which they had no control.84 
In the 1960s, however, equal-protection claims worked primarily 
as a way to showcase the personhood of the fetus. Anti-abortion 
constitutionalists developed two central and interrelated definitions 
of personhood, based respectively on law and biology: “The progress 
of the law in the recognition of the fetus as a human person for all 
purposes has been strong and clearly and roughly proportional to the 
growth of knowledge of biology and embryology.”85 
Legal definitions drew on property, criminal law, and tort 
precedents, in order to show that the law had already determined the 
fetus to be a person or was well on its way to doing so.86 Medical 
contentions, by contrast, worked to persuade legislators and 
members of the public that “the unborn child [would] qualify as a 
person within the purview” of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 
Activists defined personhood partly as a matter of individuality, 
wholeness, and uniqueness. Science could demonstrate “factually 
that abortion destroys an individuated and unique human life.”88 
“Medical knowledge,” the argument went, “has progressed to such 
an extent that we now know that an embryo contains all the 
 
 82.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1996) (observing that “heightened 
scrutiny” applies to classifications involving sex, race, and ancestry); Reva B. Siegel, Equality 
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (reconstructing how social movement conflict shaped 
modern understandings of discrimination on account of race).  
 83.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–29. 
 84.  See Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 134. See also Robert Byrn, Abortion on 
Demand: Whose Morality, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 26–27 (1970–71) [hereinafter Abortion 
on Demand]. 
 85.  David Louisell, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA 
L. REV. 233, 234 (1968–1969). 
 86.  See, e.g., id. at 235–44; Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 129; A. James 
Quinn & James A. Griffin, The Rights of the Unborn, 3 JURIST 577, 578 (1971); Note, The 
Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of Life, 56 IOWA L. REV. 994, 997–1003 
(1970–1971) [hereinafter The Unborn Child]. 
 87.  See The Unborn Child, supra note 86, at 996. 
 88.  Byrn, supra note 84, at 16. 
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fundamental material necessary for the development and growth of 
every organ, system, and part of the human body.”89 
Equal protection arguments offered one strategy for dramatizing 
these understandings of personhood. As one pro-life attorney 
explained, the Equal Protection Clause “applies only to persons.”90 
Litigating abortion cases would show that “the unborn child is a 
human being and it is difficult to conceive of a human being who is 
not a person.”91 
In the late 1960s, Berkeley Law School Professor David Louisell 
offered an alternative technique for dramatizing fetal personhood. 
Like other anti-abortion scholars, Louisell assumed that the 
Constitution protected a fundamental right to life but did not 
explain its origin.92 His focus was on the procedural protections due 
to a fetus before an abortion was performed. Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, persons could not be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.93 That abortion ended a life 
was obvious to Louisell.94 A procedural due process claim, in turn, 
allowed pro-life attorneys to argue for fetal personhood. The process 
due to these persons, Louisell suggested, might involve the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem: “Appointment of a guardian [ad 
litem] to represent the fetus would seem feasible and would be the 
minimum starting point for any attempt at due process . . . .”95 
By the early 1970s, the movement had developed an argument 
comparing abortion to the imprisonment or death sentence facing 
convicted criminals. Before the State could take a life, the argument 
went, the government had an obligation to appoint a guardian ad 
litem or provide other adequate procedural protections. Anti-
abortion activists’ work mirrored the strategy of progressive social 
movements using procedural due process to change the 
understanding of what counted as a right (or a rights-holding 
individual). As the welfare-rights movement deployed procedural 
due process to build protection for “new property,” such as welfare 
 
 89.  Quinn & Griffin, supra note 87, at 577. 
 90.  Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 134. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See Louisell, supra note 85, at 248. 
 93.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 94.  See Louisell, supra note 85, at 246. 
 95.  Id. at 251. 
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benefits, the anti-abortion movement used procedural due process in 
an effort to change the constitutional status of the fetus.96 
The procedural due-process strategy immediately attracted the 
interest of the NRLC. In a 1970 legal report, NRLC attorney 
Martin McKernan explained: 
All in all, the law has consistently established certain procedural 
safeguards and fundamental rights to which the unborn was 
entitled. The most fundamental of rights—not to be deprived of 
life without due process—cannot be ignored. However, these 
arguments must be demonstrated to any court [. . .] through the 
intervention of interested state right-to-life groups. In one federal 
court challenge to a state abortion statute a doctor was allowed to 
enter the case as an intervenor on behalf of all unborn children in 
that state. This enabled attorneys to offer testimony [. . .] and call 
witnesses.97 
McKernan suggested that a guardian ad litem could literally and 
figuratively represent the fetus, bringing forth evidence of fetal 
uniqueness, pain, and humanity.98 The guardian could make both 
due-process and equal-protection arguments while demonstrating 
that the fetus was as human as anyone sitting in the courtroom. 
As McKernan’s argument suggested, many leading abortion 
opponents assumed that the Constitution already protected fetal 
rights, and movement leaders prioritized constitutional strategies 
based on this assumption. While some abortion opponents, like 
future Attorney General and Senator John Ashcroft, called for the 
introduction of a constitutional amendment protecting fetal life as 
early as 1972,99 most movement members followed McKernan in 
insisting that the Constitution already protected fetal rights. 
 
 96.  See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For cases 
considering innovative definitions of property in a procedural due process setting, see, e.g., 
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1978) (gas and electric 
services); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975) (public school attendance); Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972) (government employment); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare benefits). 
 97.  Martin McKernan, Legal Report: Court Cases (July 1972) (The NRLC Papers, Box 
4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich.). 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  See 144 CONG. REC. S5694-06 (1998). Indeed, the National Committee for a 
Human Life Amendment, Inc., an organization dedicated to the passage of the human life 
amendment, did not form until after Roe. See Robert Lynch, The National Committee for a 
Human Life Amendment: Its Goals and Origins, 20 CATH. LAW. 303, 304–06 (1974). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 3:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
892 
Before Roe, Byrn and New York State Right to Life tested out 
the strategy that Louisell and McKernan proposed. Those attracted 
to this strategy proved to be diverse, including blue-collar workers 
and homemakers as well as attorneys.100 Members tended to be white 
residents of rural or suburban neighborhoods, most of whom were 
over thirty years old.101 The New York Times described these activists 
as “average, middle-class ladies and gentlemen.”102 As was the case 
with many anti-abortion organizations before Roe, New York State 
Right to Life counted lawyers and doctors among its members103 but 
took some time to develop a sophisticated political or legal 
strategy.104 In the first several years of its existence, the organization 
functioned primarily as a “letter-writing operation,” seeking to 
educate legislators and voters about what activists saw as the 
personhood of the fetus.105 Over time, activists realized that they 
would have to promote their views in the legislature and the courts 
more actively. As part of this effort, these activists framed their goals 
in more explicitly constitutional terms, taking their organization’s 
name from the right to life mentioned in “the Declaration of 
Independence and . . . the United States Declaration of Human 
Rights . . . .”106 
After New York had repealed all restrictions on abortion access, 
New York State Right to Life also pursued litigation to advance its 
view of fetal rights. Byrn petitioned to be named guardian ad litem 
for all of the unborn children scheduled to be aborted in city 
hospitals.107 The case he brought, Byrn v. New York City Health and 
Hospitals Corporation, allowed his attorneys to speak for these 
fetuses, insisting that “‘hundreds of [their] clients [would] be 
 
 100.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM34. 
 101.  See, e.g., id. at SM10. 
 102.  Id. On the role of professionals in early anti-abortion organizations, see, e.g., 
LUKER, supra note 66, at 68–72, 145–46 (1984). By contrast, Ziad Munson’s recent work 
stresses the importance of relational ties in the mobilization of anti-abortion activists. See ZIAD 
MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION 
WORKS 52–53 (2010). 
 103.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM34. 
 104.  See, e.g., id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Robert Tomasson, A Lawyer Challenges the Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
1971, at 29. 
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murdered’” unless the court intervened.108 As guardian ad litem, 
Byrn argued that the scheduled abortions violated fetal rights to 
equal protection and due process of the law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.109 In January 1972, the trial court granted Byrn’s 
petition and issued an injunction preventing abortions in city 
hospitals.110 The move seemed to signal that biological assertions of 
personhood were working. The court reasoned: 
Credence must, therefore, be given to testimony given in affidavit 
form by plaintiff from accredited scientists that an unborn human 
infant has a pulsating human heart; that at that stage of 
development the child’s brain, spinal cord and nervous system has 
been established and that, as medical fact, the fetus is a living 
human being.111 
However, the opinions of both the Appellate Division and the 
New York Court of Appeals called into question the wisdom of the 
existing, science-based strategy. In both instances, the courts 
assumed that biological evidence demonstrated the personhood of 
the fetus: 
It is not effectively contradicted, if it was contradicted at all, that 
modern biological disciplines accept that upon conception a fetus 
has an independent genetic “package” with the potential to 
become a full-fledged human being and that it has an autonomy of 
development and character.112 
However, biological evidence did not determine legal 
personhood, for personhood was “a policy question which in most 
instances devolves upon the Legislature.”113 
The outcome of Byrn reflected a strategy devised by abortion-
rights activists like Larry Lader and Garrett Hardin: the influence of 
contentions that the question of personhood depended on inherently 
subjective, often religious beliefs. As part of this strategy, in a 1968 
 
 108.  Order Is Sought in Abortion Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1971, at 32. 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  Murray Schumach, Judge Acts to Stay Abortions in Municipal Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 1972, at A1. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 888 (N.Y. 1972). See 
also Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) 
(assessing uncontested medical affidavits concerning fetal personhood). 
 113.  Byrn, 286 N.E.2d at 889. See also Byrn, 38 A.D.2d at 326–31. 
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article published in the Journal of Marriage and Family, Hardin 
argued that medicine or science did not establish the meaning of 
fetal personhood.114 Personhood, Hardin argued, was “a matter of 
definition, not fact; and we can define [it] any way we wish.”115 
Following a major television debate on abortion, Lader similarly 
advised pro-choice activists: 
Have all your facts and material prepared on the issue of potential 
life versus a human person . . . Put your opponents on the 
defensive—their view of the human person represents a minority, 
religious view. It has no medical credence. They don’t have the 
right to force the majority to think as they do.116 
The Byrn litigation suggested that the liberalization of abortion 
laws in the legislatures and courts depended on more than public 
ignorance about what the fetus was. Courts that assumed the truth 
of the anti-abortion movement’s biological assertions nonetheless 
concluded that fetuses had no constitutional rights. Consider, for 
example, the outcome of litigation in Doe v. Scott, a case concerning 
the constitutionality of an Illinois abortion ban.117 Anti-abortion 
activists in Illinois, including Chicago attorney Dennis Horan and 
physician Brent Heffernan, used Doe as an opportunity to put on 
display their own arguments for personhood. Horan explained to the 
press that law in the state “recognizes that the unborn child has 
constitutional rights the same as any other individual.”118 He viewed 
court decisions to appoint a guardian ad litem as the first step in the 
achievement of “complete protection of the child from the 
beginning of its life.”119 
In spite of Horan and Heffernan’s best efforts, the Illinois 
District Court questioned whether the State’s interest truly involved 
fetal life at all since the government had ignored any concern about 
the quality of life and forced “the birth of every fetus, no matter how 
defective or how intensely unwanted by its parents.”120 Even if the 
 
 114.  Garret Hardin, Abortion—or Compulsory Pregnancy?, 30 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 246 
(1968). 
 115.  Id. at 250. 
 116.  Strategy Memorandum, Larry Lader to NARAL Board Members et al. (Fall 1972) 
(The NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univer.). 
 117.  Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
 118.  Abortion Foes Begin To Fight, CHI. DEF., Feb. 13, 1971, at 21. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Doe, 321 F. Supp. at 1391. 
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fetus did have any constitutional interest, the court concluded, the 
“countervailing rights of pregnant women” trumped those 
interests.121 In other instances, the courts rejected biological 
personhood claims altogether. Abele v. Markle, a Connecticut 
opinion, suggested that the biological evidence was at best unclear. 
Instead, personhood was a matter of religious belief: an effort to 
“impose [. . .] uniformity of thought” upon the woman and the 
abortion provider.122 
The setbacks of the late 1960s and early 1970s made clear that 
the movement would have to do more to demonstrate the existence 
of a right to life. These initial failures would later push anti-abortion 
activists toward a sometimes costly originalist strategy. In the short 
term, however, movement members sought to identify a more 
effective way of arguing for a right to life—one based on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anti-abortion law 
review articles began contending that “[a]lthough the Constitution 
contains no express reference to the right to life,” the Declaration of 
Independence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and international law 
protected that right.123 Byrn summarized one argument of this kind: 
The Declaration of Independence holds as self-evident the moral 
truths “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The fourteenth 
amendment institutionalized these principles [. . .] in the 
Constitution.124 
By the 1970s, when Byrn was writing, scholars like Robert Bork 
and Raoul Berger had already begun to develop an interpretive 
theory that later came to be known as originalism.125 Since these 
theorists privileged adherence to the intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution, Bork and Berger urged judges to look only to the text 
and history of the Constitution itself.126 Scholars like Rehnquist and 
Bork expressed particular skepticism about the Supreme Court’s 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  351 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Conn. 1972). 
 123.  The Unborn Child, supra note 86, at 1004; see also Abortion in Perspective, supra 
note 67, at 128; In Defense of the Right to Live, supra note 67, at 697; Quinn & Griffin, supra 
note 86, at 579. 
 124.  Abortion on Demand, supra note 84, at 19. 
 125.  See, e.g., Strang, supra note 59, at 2003–05; Whittington, supra note 14, at 601–03. 
 126.  See, e.g., Strang, supra note 59, at 2003–05; Whittington, supra note 14, at 601–03. 
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recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.127 In opinions like 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court had recognized the existence of a 
fundamental right to privacy that was at most implicit in the 
constitutional text.128 For anyone guided by a jurisprudence of 
“original intent,” these opinions appeared result-oriented, 
unprincipled, and incoherent. 
For their part, Byrn and anti-abortion attorneys strongly believed 
that the Constitution protected fundamental, Fourteenth 
Amendment rights that did not appear in the text of the 
Constitution, and they often insisted that courts use unconventional 
legal sources in identifying the existence of such rights. The National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops relied on not only the Declaration of 
Independence, but also on natural law, as a source of the right to 
life: “The basic human rights guaranteed by our American laws are, 
therefore, unalienable because their source is not man-made 
legislation but the Creator of all mankind.”129 
For the most part, however, abortion opponents developed a 
secular theory of constitutional rights that drew on reasoning similar 
to the Griswold Court’s. According to this theory, courts should 
endeavor to identify fundamental rights not spelled out in the text of 
the Constitution. Representing the AUL, Dennis Horan and his 
colleagues argued in 1976: 
John Locke, whose influence on the thinking of the founders of this 
nation is well known, wrote in his Second Treatise of Civil Government 
of the natural rights to life and property. These basic ideas found their 
way into the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 . . . . In 
speaking of the first official action of this nation, which declared the 
foundation of our government in those words, the United States 
Supreme Court has said that ‘. . . it is always safe to read the letter of the 
[C]onstitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.’ . . . 
[T]he importance of the right to life in modern political and social 
theory has remained nearly unscathed as is evidenced not only by the 
Fourth Article of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . but 
also by the Second Article of the European Human Rights 
Convention, and the movement to abolish capital punishment.130 
 
 127.  See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 60, at 409–10; Bork, supra note 60, at 13–14. 
 128.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 129.  Statements of National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 19 CATH. LAW. 29, 30 (1973). 
 130.  Motion and Brief for Dr. Eugene Diamond and Americans United for Life, Inc. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 35–36, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
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The reliance on unconventional legal sources—particularly the 
Declaration of Independence and international law—distinguished 
anti-abortion constitutionalism from an emerging jurisprudence of 
original intent. Abortion opponents also endorsed a different vision 
of the judicial role, at times explicitly approving of the interpretive 
method used in substantive due process decisions like Griswold. As 
late as 1976, an amicus brief submitted by the United States 
Catholic Conference set forth this view: 
The granting of legal personhood . . . is, we submit, properly the 
product of a constitutionalanalysis [sic] which recognizes the 
existence of rights which must be said to be implicit in other, more 
explicitlyprotectedrights [sic] . . . . The process used to reach the 
penumbral rights enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut is the self-
same recognition of necessary implication. . . . It is ironic that the 
majority in Roe not only failed to use the penumbral process 
with respect to fetal life, but also misapplied it with respect to the 
pregnant woman.131 
Anti-abortion use of Griswold and other substantive-due process 
reasoning seems surprising in light of contemporary criticisms by 
abortion opponents and conservatives of judicial overreaching. In the 
early 1970s, however, abortion opponents wanted to build on 
existing substantive due process jurisprudence in order to establish 
the existence of a fundamental right to life rooted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Indeed, before Roe, it was supporters of abortion rights 
who benefitted from concerns about judicial overreaching. In Byrn, 
for example, deference to the will of popular majorities convinced 
the courts to reject a claim of constitutional fetal rights: “[T]his 
court is not required to weigh and choose between the competing 
values urged by those who support the [abortion repeal] law and 
those who oppose it. The Legislature has made that 
determination . . . .”132 
 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 178721 (citations 
omitted). 
 131.  Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 16–17, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419); cf. Robert Byrn, Which Way for Judicial Imperialism, 4 HUM. LIFE 
REV. 19 (1977) (arguing for neutrality on the question of judicial restraint or judicial 
activism); Harold O. J. Brown, What Makes the Law the Law, 4 HUM. LIFE REV. 68, 68–73 
(Fall 1978) (endorsing a natural law interpretation of the Constitution). 
 132.  Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 331 (1972). 
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B. Roe v. Wade, Constitutional Amendments, and the Quest for 
Perfection 
At least at first, Roe v. Wade reinforced movement members’ 
interest in an implied-rights theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Initially, as we shall see, anti-abortion activists rallied around a 
proposed fetal-life amendment to the Constitution—a campaign to 
forever entrench the movement’s beliefs in the Constitution. During 
this struggle, abortion opponents continued to elaborate on the 
constitutional theory that they developed before Roe. This theory 
stood in tension with interpretive theories centered on the idea of 
original intent. In particular, abortion opponents expressly rejected 
any amendment that would return the abortion question to 
democratic politics—the result in Roe that first-generation originalist 
jurists would later endorse.133 
The campaign for a perfect constitutional amendment began 
with the startling defeat the movement suffered in Roe.134 Roe and its 
companion case, Doe v. Bolton,135 struck down the abortion laws 
applicable in forty-six states.136 As importantly, Roe rejected anti-
abortion arguments about fetal personhood. The Court made clear 
that it would “not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins.”137 Read against the backdrop of movement conflict in the 
period, however, Roe did take sides on this question, adopting the 
view that fetal personhood was a matter of individual belief.138 In 
support of this conclusion, the Court stressed that “those trained in 
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology 
[were] unable to arrive at any consensus . . . .”139 
The Court went further, questioning the value of medical 
evidence suggesting that life began at conception. “Substantial 
problems [with] this view are posed,” Roe explained, “by new 
embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a 
‘process’ . . . rather than an event, and by new medical techniques 
 
 133.  On the belief that originalists would overrule Roe, see, e.g., Joan Williams, Abortion, 
Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1651, 1660 (1989). 
 134.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 135.  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 136.  See Richard Pildes, Is The Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 103, 150–51. 
 137.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 138.  See id. 
 139.  Id. 
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such as menstrual extraction [and] the morning after pill . . . .”140 
The opinion treated personhood as a question of individual belief 
while insisting that medical evidence factually undermined a 
conclusion that life began at conception. 
Roe made clear that biological evidence of fetal personhood 
would not establish the constitutional protection movement 
members desired. The Court had questioned the validity of the 
biological evidence on which abortion opponents so often relied. 
More importantly, Roe treated biological assertions as irrelevant, 
since personhood was truly a matter of individual conscience and 
subjective belief. 
However, Roe did not convince abortion opponents to abandon 
their ambitious constitutional agenda. Far from setting aside 
arguments for a right to life, abortion opponents prioritized a 
constitutional amendment that would perfectly capture their beliefs, 
restoring what abortion opponents viewed as a longstanding 
constitutional tradition of protecting fetal life.141 The push for an 
anti-abortion amendment began in February 1973, when many of 
the nation’s leading activists gathered to discuss post-Roe strategy.142 
Those present focused on the creation of a constitutional 
amendment that would reflect the movement’s foundational 
commitments, passing a resolution that stated: “State Right to Life 
groups and people pro-life everywhere unanimously support an effort 
to bring about an amendment to the United States Constitution that 
would guarantee the right to life for all humans.”143 
In Congress, two fetal-life amendments were in circulation. The 
Buckley Amendment, proposed by Senator James Buckley 
(Conservative–NY), provided that: “With respect to the right to life, 
the word ‘person’ . . . applies to all human beings, including their 
unborn offspring at every stage of . . . development . . . .”144 An 
alternative proposed by Representative Larry Hogan (R–MD) stated: 
 
 140.  Id. at 161. 
 141.  See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 144. 
 142.  See Meeting Minutes, NRLC Ad Hoc Strategy Meeting (Feb. 11, 1973) (The 
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, 
University of Michigan). 
 143.  Id. at 7. 
 144.  Nat’l Comm. for a Human Life Amend., Human Life Amendment: Major Texts 1, 
available at http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2013). 
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“Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human 
being, from the moment of conception, of life without due process 
of law . . . .”145 
Leading anti-abortion academics worried that neither proposal 
would fully protect fetal rights. For example, abortion opponent 
Joseph Witherspoon, a professor at the University of Texas, 
concluded that the Hogan Amendment’s vague reference to “the 
moment of conception” would open the door to Supreme Court 
interpretations permitting abortion in the first month of 
pregnancy.146 For Witherspoon, the Buckley Amendment appeared 
clearer insofar as it protected fetuses “at any stage of biological 
development,” regardless of what the Justices believed “conception” 
to mean.147 As importantly, the Buckley Amendment more clearly 
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment had already protected fetal 
rights before Roe came down.148 By contrast, Dennis Horan, a 
professor at the University of Chicago and leading anti-abortion 
litigator, argued that the Buckley Amendment did not include strong 
enough “actuating language,” “merely re-defin[ing] the word 
‘person’” and leaving too much about the Amendment’s application 
open to reinterpretation.149 On the other hand, Horan thought that 
judges could read the Hogan Amendment to allow for certain legal 
abortions—a problem many activists hoped to avoid.150 
Generally, movement members found neither proposal fully 
satisfactory. As attorney Nellie Gray explained in attacking the 
existing proposals: “Now is not the time, if ever there is a time, for 
compromise.”151 Movement members demanded an amendment that 
perfectly reflected their legal convictions. In framing an ideal 
 
 145.  Id. at 3. 
 146.  See, e.g., Memorandum, Joseph Witherspoon to the Nat’l Right to Life Comm. 
Exec. Comm. 2–3 (Aug. 14, 1973) (The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, 
Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  Memorandum, Dennis Horan to Nat’l Right to Life Comm. Policy Comm. 2–3 
(Sep. 5, 1973) (The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford 
Memorial Library, University of Michigan) (finding that “more technical problems with the 
Buckley Amendment than with the Hogan Amendment would be incurred”). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Nellie Gray to NRLC Legal Advisory Committee (Sep. 24, 1973) (The American 
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of 
Michigan). 
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amendment, the NRLC polled a variety of anti-abortion attorneys 
and law professors.152 The ensuing dialogue made clear that 
unorthodox and complicated views defined anti-abortion 
constitutionalism. Many of the attorneys polled demanded that a 
fetal-life amendment ban private as well as state action—something 
that neither congressional proposal did.153 In constitutional law, the 
state-action doctrine provides that only government actors’ 
violations of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment are 
actionable. The state-action doctrine had its fair share of critics, but 
its persistence stemmed from approval of limited state power to 
interfere with private beliefs or behaviors.154 Abortion opponents 
endorsed a much broader view of state power. “We felt that we had 
to go to the same parameters as the U.S. Supreme Court did,” 
Horan explained on behalf of the group of attorneys. “[S]ince they 
allowed private destruction of the unborn the amendment should 
explicitly prohibit private destruction of the unborn.”155 In 
contemporary politics, conservatives often favor use of the state 
action doctrine as a way of limiting government interference with 
private action.156 In the 1970s, however, abortion opponents 
adopted a view of state action doctrine that more closely resembled 
the arguments made by liberal constitutional theorists today.157 
 
 152.  Dennis Horan to NRLC Board of Directors 1 (Jan. 19, 1974) (The American 
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of 
Michigan). 
 153.  See id.at 2. 
 154.  See, e.g., Lilian BeVier and John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 
96 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2010) (summarizing criticisms of the doctrine and offering a defense of 
its merits). 
 155.  Horan to NRLC Board of Directors, supra note 152, at 2. 
 156.  See, e.g., Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 35 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 273 (2010) (analyzing the common view that proponents of a restrictive state action 
doctrine tend to be ideological conservatives); James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State 
Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1295 (2007) 
(suggesting that “if conservative ideology does dominate the Court,” then the justices will 
more likely adopt “a more restrictive state action doctrine”); Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action 
Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1383–84 (2006) 
(describing the conservative view of state action doctrine as a “barrier to governmental control 
of private parties”). 
 157.  For progressive arguments for a broad understanding of state action, see, e.g., LOUIS 
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 68–69 (1996);.Liliya Abramchayev, A Social Contract Argument for 
the State’s Duty to Protect from Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 849, 
863 (2004) (“State action is pervasive and its traces can be found in the background of any 
situation”); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. 
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The group of attorneys wished not only to ban virtually all 
abortions, but also to clearly establish the existence of a right to 
life—something that existing proposals supposedly failed to do. In a 
March 1974 press release, the NRLC explained: “The proposed 
amendment is designed principally to deal with the constitutional 
guarantee of the civil right of unborn children which was destroyed 
by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.”158 
Activists prioritized the advancement of a fundamental, 
Fourteenth Amendment right to life and generally opposed 
alternative proposals designed primarily to curb judicial 
overreaching. Indeed, when Congress considered various 
amendments that would overturn Roe and return the abortion issue 
to democratic politics, leading activists like Byrn came out in 
opposition.159 Because these proposals would not ban abortion in 
every state, they seemed more likely to succeed than did more 
absolutist personhood amendments, which some observers believed 
would also criminalize certain forms of contraception.160 
Nonetheless, Byrn and the larger anti-abortion movement 
opposed a states’ rights amendment. He argued that such a proposal 
contradicted anti-abortion constitutional commitments. He 
explained: “A States Rights Amendment, in effect, recognizes that an 
unborn child is a human being, but denies that the child has a 
fundamental right to live.”161 Offering similar objections, attorneys 
polled by the NRLC uniformly rejected a states-rights proposal.162 
The goal, it seemed, was the establishment of a fundamental right, 
not merely the overruling of Roe. 
 
L.J. 779, 789 (2004) (“There is no region of social life that even conceptually can be marked 
off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”); Cass Sunstein, State Action Is Always 
Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465 (2002). 
 158.  Press Release, NRLC, (Mar. 14, 1974) (on file with The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan). 
 159.  See Nat’l Comm. for a Human Life Amend., supra note 144. 
 160. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 163–66 (1992) 
(discussing the advantages of one such states-rights approach considered in 1980). 
 161.  Robert Byrn, A Human Life Amendment: What Would It Mean? HUM. LIFE REV. 
50, 51–52 (1975) (arguing that a majority of anti-abortion activists opposed a states-rights 
amendment). Some abortion opponents did endorse a states-rights amendment. See, e.g., 
Abortion I: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Const’l Amendments of the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 354 (1974) (statement of Paul Ramsey); Abortion Part I: 
Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Const’l Amends. of the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 93d Cong. 164–66 (1974) (statement of David Louisell). 
 162.  Horan to NRLC Board of Directors, supra note 152. 
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On the surface, the amendment strategy seemed to acknowledge 
that the Constitution did not already protect a right to life. For 
movement members, however, the amendment represented a chance 
to legitimate claims that the Constitution—and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular—had always recognized that right. As anti-
abortion activists explained, they wished not to create, but rather to 
“restore to unborn children of human parents the constitutional 
status and protection of persons with respect to their right to life.”163 
According to anti-abortion attorneys, the right to life emerged most 
clearly “during the nineteenth century, with the increased sensitivity 
to individual human values which is illustrated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.”164 March for Life, a new 
organization founded in 1974 by Nellie Gray, spread a similar 
message. “I believe in the right to privacy and certainly the right of 
each human being—male and female—to control one’s own body,” 
a March for Life brochure explained.165 But “when man and woman 
have participated in the creation of another human being . . . their 
control over their bodies and demand for conveniences must be 
subordinated at least to the right to life of their child.”166 
Between 1974 and 1979, anti-abortion constitutionalists 
continued to develop a complicated constitutional agenda. Activists 
argued that the right to life derived from the Declaration of 
Independence. The values shaping that document became part of the 
fabric of the Fourteenth Amendment and of international human 
rights law. Ideally, this right to life would be protected—whether by 
the courts or by a constitutional amendment—from the democratic 
process. 
This constitutional vision had tremendous power for its 
proponents. Even as the prospects for ratification of a human life 
amendment dimmed, anti-abortion constitutionalists continued to 
prioritize it. Gradually, however, other movement members made 
progress in narrowing the Court’s interpretation of Roe. The 
movement’s litigation successes brought to the surface questions 
about the movement’s legal priorities. Did abortion opponents wish 
 
 163.  Press Release, NRLC, supra note 158, at 2. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Press Release, The National March for Life Committee (Jan. 22, 1974) (on file 
with The American Citizens Concern for Life Papers at the Gerald Ford Memorial Library at 
the University of Michigan). 
 166.  Id. 
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primarily to defend a cherished set of constitutional values, or did 
they wish to make an immediate impact on the number of abortions 
performed? The process of answering this question was long and 
difficult, ultimately bringing abortion opponents into the originalist 
coalition. 
C. Redefining Roe, 1976–1981 
For anti-abortion constitutionalists, prospects in the Supreme 
Court seemed bleak in the mid-1970s. Nonetheless, Horan and the 
AUL continued to participate in amicus advocacy. The AUL’s 
influence was evident in a series of cases on state-level bans on the 
public funding of abortion: Maher v. Roe, Poelker v. Doe, and Beal v. 
Doe.167 These laws had fared badly in the lower courts. In Maher, the 
district court had struck down a public-funding ban.168 Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the court held, the State could not choose 
to fund childbirth but not abortion, since abortion itself was a 
fundamental right.169 
AUL attorneys responded that the abortion right in Roe simply 
did not apply in funding cases.170 Roe protected only a freedom from 
state interference. By contrast, in a brief submitted in Poelker, a case 
on the constitutionality of a policy prohibiting all abortions in city 
hospitals, the AUL contended that “the abortional act [. . .] enjoys 
no constitutional protection in itself.”171 By extension, the AUL brief 
asserted, physicians in public facilities could, under Roe, 
constitutionally refuse to perform abortion. As the brief framed it, 
Roe recognized a right belonging to a “woman in consultation with 
her physician, not demanding of her physician.”172 
A second and ultimately more successful argument explored the 
idea that abortion rights protected only a woman’s privacy. The 
definition of abortion as a privacy right did not necessarily foreclose a 
constitutional demand for government support, as many district 
 
 167.  Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. 
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
 168.  Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663–64 (D. Conn. 1975). 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  See Brief for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 75-442). 
 171.  Id. at 15. 
 172.  Id. 
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courts in the mid-1970s had concluded.173 Nonetheless, the AUL 
managed to frame privacy rights as incompatible with any 
requirement of government support or participation. As the AUL 
LDEF brief explained: “If the abortion decision is so private [. . .] it 
follows that government shall not itself be compelled to respond to 
the demand of the exercise of that right.”174 Under Roe, the state 
could not interfere with a woman’s decision making but had no 
obligation to fund abortion.175 
The Maher Court adopted reasoning that reflected the claims 
made by abortion opponents and attorneys representing the states 
defending the laws. The Court explained that Roe “did not declare 
an unqualified constitutional right to an abortion.”176 Instead, Roe 
merely protected “the woman from unduly burdensome interference 
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”177 
For this reason, the State was free to “make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment 
by the allocation of public funds.”178 
In 1980, in Harris v. McRae, the Court upheld the Hyde 
Amendment, a federal ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion.179 
Horan and his colleagues believed that Harris marked an important 
change in the abortion debate: 
Under Harris, the Constitution would not be violated even if, so 
long as the woman’s choice of abortion is not directly interdicted, 
she is effectively surrounded . . . by public pressure and 
inducements to abandon her decision to abort. This situation is far 
from the socially respectable status that would make abortion on 
demand sociologically, psychologically, and politically secure.180 
 
 173.  See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1975) (same) (holding that a 
funding ban violated the Equal Protection Clause since the State could not choose to fund 
childbirth while denying funding for the fundamental abortion right); Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 
611 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); 
Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chi. Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); Doe 
v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); Doe v. Rose, 49 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 
1974) (same). 
 174.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 170, at 15. 
 175.  See id. 
 176.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 474. 
 179.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 180.  Dennis Horan & Thomas Marzen, The Supreme Court on Abortion Funding: The 
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Horan also believed it to be significant that the Court had 
sanctioned legislatures’ interest in protecting fetal life.181 As activists 
like Horan saw it, opinions like Harris might pave the way for the 
overruling of Roe. Decisions like Maher and Harris recognized a 
more expansive and legitimate state interest in fetal life. Significantly, 
Maher and Harris also narrowed the scope of the abortion right, 
giving legislators more latitude in regulating the procedure. 
Abortion opponents’ success in Maher and Harris stood in sharp 
contrast to the fate of fetal-life amendments, none of which had 
made significant progress.182 These cases showed that anti-abortion 
activists could make progress in reinterpreting Roe rather than in 
promoting a fundamental right to life. Just the same, narrowing Roe 
fell short of the constitutional goals the movement had set. At most, 
the Court appeared willing to uphold restrictions that would reduce 
access to abortion.183 The Justices took as a given that the 
Constitution protected a right to abortion, and nothing in abortion 
jurisprudence hinted at the existence of a constitutional right to life. 
Abortion opponents certainly welcomed any opinion that would 
make it harder to get an abortion, but their priority remained the 
ratification of an amendment protecting the right to life.184 
The AUL’s experience revealed an underlying tension in the anti-
abortion constitutional project. While activists privileged the defense 
of certain shared constitutional values, members of the anti-abortion 
movement also demanded concrete evidence of progress. Over the 
course of the next several decades, anti-abortion constitutionalists 
had to choose between short-term success and the promotion of 
their basic constitutional values. Gradually, some activists came to 
the conclusion that at least in the foreseeable future, the movement 
could not have both. 
 
Second Time Around, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 229 (Thomas W. Hilgers 
et al. eds., 1981). 
 181.  See id. 
 182. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 64, at 210 (on the movement’s difficulties 
in securing a human-life amendment). 
 183.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 56 (1976) 
(describing its holding as a “logical and anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade” and the right it 
announced); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (explaining that the Court’s holding 
“signals no retreat from Roe (v. Wade) or the cases applying it”). 
 184. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 139–44 (on the emphasis put on a human life 
amendment). 
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III. ORIGINALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ROE, 1980 TO THE 
PRESENT 
The Reagan administration reshaped both anti-abortion 
constitutionalism and the political practice of originalism. At the 
time that Reagan’s presidential campaign revived interest in a 
jurisprudence of original intent, it still seemed to clash with anti-
abortion constitutional priorities. Nonetheless, Reagan suggested 
that the judges he selected would overrule Roe—not because they 
believed in the existence of constitutional fetal rights, but rather 
because they saw Roe as bad constitutional law. For abortion 
opponents in the 1980s, originalism came to seem a realistic 
compromise solution. If they could not guarantee constitutional 
recognition of the right to life, the argument went, abortion 
opponents could reasonably settle for the overruling of Roe. 
Conservative originalism promised to deliver this result. 
In the mid-1980s, however, abortion opponents were divided 
about the importance of judicial nominations and about the value of 
originalism. Some movement members believed that only direct 
confrontation could change laws on abortion. After Robert Bork’s 
failed 1987 bid to become a Supreme Court Justice, members of 
mainstream groups like the NRLC and Americans United for Life 
invested more in presidential politics and federal nominations. Bork 
emerged from the hearings as a symbol of the lost opportunity to 
overrule Roe—to abortion opponents, he represented the elusive 
fifth vote to overrule the 1973 decision. Convinced that Bork had 
been victimized by left-wing interest groups, abortion opponents 
concluded that they had not done enough to counter attacks on 
Reagan’s nominee and his originalist arguments. In the coming 
years, abortion opponents vowed not to repeat this mistake. In the 
late 1980s and beyond, movement members put new emphasis on 
federal judicial nominations and on originalist attacks on the Roe 
decision. Whether or not it was a second-best solution, originalism 
became a powerful tool used to chip away at Roe. 
A. Framing the Conservative Originalist Coalition, 1981–1987 
In the 1980s, when the term “originalism” came into vogue, 
think tanks and attorneys associated with groups like the Federalist 
Society and the Heritage Foundation popularized first-generation 
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originalist arguments.185 These theorists provided an intellectual 
framework for demands made by both abortion opponents and New 
Right groups intent on changing the laws governing issues from 
school prayer to sex education.186 In turn, leading legal thinkers in 
the Reagan administration, like William French Smith and Edwin 
Meese III, drew on contentions forged by New Right lawyers.187 
By 1987, originalism was both an interpretive method and the 
basis for a constitutional coalition that brought together a variety of 
right-leaning social movements.188 Joining this alliance offered 
tangible benefits for abortion opponents. By uniting with the large 
and influential New Right and Religious Right movements, abortion 
opponents could more effectively pressure Congress and the Reagan 
administration. Moreover, in adopting originalist arguments, the 
anti-abortion movement could promote its agenda in a way that 
resonated with the legal mainstream. 
What later came to be seen as conservative first-generation 
originalist scholarship had already developed a good deal by 1980, 
when the Republican Party platform proposed “the appointment of 
judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family 
values and the value of human life.”189 The platform became 
instantly controversial, given Reagan’s apparent indifference to the 
value of impartiality or to the qualifications of judicial nominees.190 
The Reagan campaign quickly backtracked, explaining that Reagan 
would nominate qualified nominees who opposed judicial 
overreaching rather than committed abortion opponents. In early 
October 1980, Reagan told the press that the platform was not 
 
 185.  See, e.g., Amanda Hollis-Bruskey, Support Structures and Constitutional Change: 
Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 516, 523–
24 (2011) (“[I]n the early 1980s, conservative movement patrons began forging alliances with 
the Federalist Society, from whose ranks several young, idealistic lawyers committed to 
conservative and libertarian principles were drawn into positions of leadership both in 
conservative [public interest law firms] and in the Reagan Justice Department”); 
SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 23–25, 27–29 (on the coining of the term “originalism”). 
See, e.g., TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 145. 
 186.  See, e.g., SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 27; TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 139. 
 187.  See, e.g., Hollis-Bruskey, supra note 185, at 524; SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 
23–25. 
 188. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 215–26 (on originalism as an expression of the 
coalition politics of the New Right). 
 189.  Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politics of the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at A23. 
 190.  See id. 
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referring exclusively to abortion when it mentioned a respect for 
life.191 The following month, William French Smith, a long-term 
Reagan ally and campaign manager, reframed Reagan’s interest in 
anti-abortion judges as a desire to select only those judges who 
rejected what Smith saw as the judicial activism of the Warren and 
Burger Courts.192 Smith explained, “In a nutshell, [Reagan’s] 
political philosophy is the laws of this country should be interpreted 
by the legislature and construed by the judiciary, and to the extent 
possible, not made by the judiciary.”193 Given Reagan’s prior 
commitment to anti-abortion judges and his need to address legal 
critics, abortion opponents could easily have understood Smith’s 
statements as code for opposition to abortion. As importantly, 
Reagan’s new commitment to judicial restraint helped to identify it 
as a constitutional strategy uniting otherwise diverse conservative 
social movements. 
However, Reagan’s first Supreme Court nominee, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, cast doubt on the connection between Reagan’s 
commitment to a philosophy of strict constructionism and his anti-
abortion credentials. In her time as an Arizona legislator, O’Connor 
had several opportunities to weigh in on policy questions involving 
sex and reproduction. In the early 1970s, she had signed a statement 
calling for population control in the United States that had been 
drafted by Dick Lamm, the leader of an effort to reform Colorado’s 
abortion ban.194 O’Connor had also been an acquaintance of Dr. 
Carolyn Gerster, a recent president of the NRLC, the nation’s largest 
anti-abortion group. After the nomination was announced, Gerster 
immediately informed the rest of the anti-abortion community that, 
during her time in the Arizona State Legislature, O’Connor had 
voted in favor of an abortion liberalization bill.195 
Abortion opponents were outraged by the nomination. Dr. John 
Willke, then-president of the NRLC, threatened to attack O’Connor 
in the press if her nomination were not withdrawn.196 In the late 
 
 191.  See id. 
 192.  See, e.g., Fred Barbesh & Mary Thorton, Smith Outlines Strategy to Curb Court 
Activism, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1981, at A1. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See, e.g., CRITCHLOW, supra note 15, at 199. 
 195.  See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON 
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 95 (2005). 
 196.  Memorandum from Marilee Melvin to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981) (on file in 
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1970s, anti-abortion organizations like the NRLC began to partner 
with newly mobilized evangelical protestants and religious 
conservatives who formed groups like the Moral Majority and 
Christian Voice.197 During the 1980 election, anti-abortion 
organizations had also worked with strategists like those who had 
founded the New Right, including veteran political operative Paul 
Weyrich and direct-mail guru Richard Viguerie.198 Abortion 
opponents who were part of a united political front seemed likely to 
enjoy greater political influence and financial support.199 
The backlash to O’Connor’s nomination brought together 
abortion opponents and New Right activists who condemned the 
nominee’s supposed support for abortion. However, only a handful 
of abortion opponents—some of them belonging to Religious Right 
or New Right organizations—expressed their opposition to 
O’Connor by referring to concerns about original intent or judicial 
activism. Gordon Jones of United Families for America, a Religious 
Right lobbying group that opposed abortion, gay rights and 
pornography, explained that O’Connor’s supposed approval of Roe 
proved her judicial philosophy to be irrevocably flawed. As he 
asserted: “[T]he issue is not abortion but judicial activism. Roe v. 
Wade happens to be the worst example of judicial activism in this 
century.”200 He even addressed the Supreme Court, suggesting that 
the Justices should be concerned about the “seriousness of the loss 
of faith experienced by the federal courts in recent years.”201 
In his congressional testimony, Dr. John Willke of the NRLC 
elaborated further on this argument: “The Supreme Court’s 1973 
abortion decision had no authentic basis in the Constitution. Rather, 
it constituted the most extreme example of ‘judicial activism’ in this 
century.”202 In testifying before Congress on O’Connor’s nomination, 
he contended that O’Connor was, by definition, an activist if she 
regarded “the 1973 abortion decisions as constitutional.”203 
 
Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California). 
 197.  See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 65, at 587–89. 
 198.  See, e.g., id. 
 199.  See id. 
 200.  Confirmation of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 378 (1981) (statement of Gordon Jones). 
 201.  Id. at 380. 
 202.  Id. at 282 (statement of Dr. John Willke). 
 203.  Id. 
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Before the confirmation hearings began, the Reagan 
administration paid little attention publicly to the anti-abortion 
attacks. An anonymous aide told the New York Times: “there’s going 
to be a lot of sound and fury, but in the end, it’s going to end up 
signifying little or nothing.”204 Less publicly, however, administration 
officials argued that more had to be done to convince the movement 
that originalism would spell the end for Roe. 
In a memorandum to Edwin Meese III, a key Reagan advisor 
and future attorney general, an administration official claimed that 
anti-abortion advocates believed that the courts “had been engaged 
in a systematic effort to prevent the people from working their will 
on the subject of abortion.”205 In fact, movement members had 
never emphasized such an argument. The White House—not 
activists—had stressed the subject of judicial overreaching.206 
The memorandum continued, “Whatever one might think of 
that argument, or of the merits of abortion itself, the intensity of 
right-to-lifers on the issue of judicial power should not be 
underestimated.”207 The memorandum proposed a nomination 
strategy that would cater to anti-abortion advocates without 
appearing partisan: “It does not follow that an abortion opponent 
should be nominated. It does follow, I think, that the nominee’s 
record on the issue be examined with special interest and that the 
nominee regard Roe v. Wade and its progeny as most unwise 
assertions of judicial power.”208 Although several years would pass 
before the Reagan administration would be in a position to 
implement the ideas set forth in the memorandum, the basic 
 
 204.  Hedrick Smith, Reagan’s Court Choice: A Deft Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
1981, at A17. 
 205.  Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981) (on file with 
the Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California). 
 206.  Some arguments against judicial activism circulated within the anti-abortion 
movement in the early 1970s. For example, the Board of Directors for the National Right to 
Life Committee passed a resolution condemning the Roe Court for its “irresponsible exercise 
of raw judicial power.” Resolution by National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors 
(July 10, 1973) (on file with the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan). 
Similarly, two New York state-based groups, Celebrate Life Committee and Women for the 
Unborn, circulated a pamphlet on the issue of curbing judicial activism. Pamphlet by Celebrate 
Life Comm. and Women for the Unborn (1973) (on file with the Gerald Ford Memorial 
Library, University of Michigan). However, as this Article shows, concerns about judicial 
overreaching did not motivate a majority of movement members. 
 207.  Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese, supra note 205. 
 208.  Id. 
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outline of a strategy was in place: the Reagan administration could 
mobilize abortion opponents by criticizing the Roe Court’s 
activism. 
The O’Connor nomination revealed divisions between the 
legal theorists, who had crafted effective originalist rhetoric, and 
the abortion opponents, who had not fully identified with it. Over 
the course of a decade, an originalist constitutional coalition 
would bridge this gap as abortion opponents and social 
conservatives came to believe that originalist arguments had 
important strategic value. 
B. Anti-abortion Legalism Versus Direct Action, 1981–1987 
For many within the anti-abortion movement, however, 
O’Connor’s nomination played one part in the movement’s 
disillusionment with conventional legal strategies. After Reagan’s 
election, abortion opponents believed that they had the votes to pass 
a statute recognizing the personhood of the fetus.209 Alternatively, 
movement members believed they could pass a measure, the Hatch 
Amendment, that would return the abortion issue to the states.210 
Debate about the Hatch Amendment confirmed that the 
movement remained committed to the idea of a fundamental right 
to life, although activists were divided about Hatch’s proposal. 
Movement pragmatists like John Willke urged his colleagues to 
endorse the Hatch Amendment for strategic reasons.211 If the Hatch 
Amendment were to pass, Willke suggested the movement could 
later pursue its true constitutional agenda—the protection of a 
fundamental right to life.212 More absolutist activists viewed the 
proposed amendment as a “betrayal of all the [movement’s] 
principles.”213 The Hatch Amendment controversy demonstrated 
that the movement still prioritized the recognition of a constitutional 
 
 209.  On the campaign for the human life bill, see, e.g., Joan Beck, The Pro-Life Groups 
Turn to Congress on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1981, at B2; Abortion Foes Offer Bill, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 11, 1981, at 8; Bernard Weinraub, Abortion Becoming a Top Priority Issue in 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1981, at A18. 
 210.  See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 160, at 160–66 (discussing the Hatch Amendment). 
 211.  See, e.g., Leslie Bennetts, Anti-Abortion Forces in Disarray a Year After Victories in 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at B2. 
 212.  See, e.g., id. 
 213.  President’s Column: Beware of False Friends, ALL ABOUT ISSUES, Sept. 1981 (on file 
in the Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas). 
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right to life. Even supporters of the Amendment viewed the undoing 
of Roe—the most that conservative originalism could promise—as at 
best a temporary and partial solution. 
By the spring of 1982, the progress of both the Human Life Bill 
and the Hatch Amendment had stalled, prompting a crisis of faith in 
the movement. Some angry abortion opponents called for a statute 
stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in abortion cases.214 
Although Reagan had emphasized abortion and other social 
questions on the campaign trail, his administration prioritized 
economic issues, disappointing abortion opponents who had 
expected major legal changes from an ally in the White House.215 In 
1983, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Services, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe and struck down a model multi-
restriction abortion statute that many abortion opponents had 
championed.216 
One columnist explained the anti-abortion response to such 
rulings: “Unable to change the Constitution through the traditional 
political process, in the legislatures, the anti-abortion forces have 
either degenerated into terrorism or are patiently waiting for the 
next appointment to the Supreme Court.”217 For some abortion 
opponents, the setbacks of the early 1980s revealed legal strategies to 
be counterproductive and hollow. Perhaps for this reason, the mid-
1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in clinic protests.218 
Organizations such as Joseph Scheidler’s Pro-Life Action League and 
Randall Terry’s Operation Rescue mounted massive demonstrations 
outside of clinics, blocking entrances and increasing “sidewalk 
counseling” and other forms of contact with women approaching 
the clinics.219 The same frustrations may underlie an alarming 
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increase in violence against abortion providers and clinics. By the 
mid-1980s, 62 clinics had been firebombed, and 24 attacks occurred 
in 1984 alone.220 Clinics reported an additional 200 bomb scares.221 
The Chicago Tribune reported the following in 1985: “A growing 
number of activists on both sides of the abortion controversy predict 
that civil disorder growing out of the [abortion] issue will dwarf 
anything the nation endured during the civil rights and antiwar 
movements of the 1960s.”222 
Other abortion opponents interpreted the setbacks of the 1980s 
as reason to work harder to guarantee the nomination of sympathetic 
(and presumably originalist) judges to the federal bench. In a 
dissenting opinion in Akron, Justice O’Connor criticized Roe’s 
trimester framework and asserted that most of the disputed abortion 
ordinance should be upheld.223 O’Connor’s dissent reinforced some 
abortion opponents’ convictions about the importance of Supreme 
Court nominations. In a newsletter to AUL constituents, 
Northwestern Law professor Victor Rosenblum explained: “That 
means we are but two—maybe one—Justices away from a Court that 
would reverse Roe if given the right chance . . . . The pro-life 
movement must therefore get prepared immediately with optimal 
reversal strategies.”224 
During the 1984 election season, conservative attorneys predicted 
that in his second term, Reagan could nominate as many as five justices 
to the Supreme Court.225 The record of those nominated in his first 
term, O’Connor and William Rehnquist (a former associate Justice who 
had been made Chief Justice), suggested that constitutional law would 
change if Reagan added more like-minded justices.226 
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Between 1984 and 1986, moreover, an originalist constitutional 
coalition took shape, making conservative originalism more 
appealing to abortion opponents. After Reagan won the 1984 
election, right-wing think tanks found themselves in a position of 
unprecedented influence. Some groups, like the Heritage 
Foundation and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, 
had been active since the late 1970s.227 Others had formed more 
recently, like the Center for Judicial Studies, founded by James R. 
McClellan, a former staffer for Senator Jesse Helms (R–NC).228 In 
the mid-1980s, however, these groups gained influence, particularly 
after Edwin Meese became attorney general.229 Meese consciously 
embraced what had become known as originalism.230 Long an 
important ally of groups angry about existing policy on matters from 
racial discrimination to states’ rights, Meese proved to be a brilliant 
popularizer of originalist rhetoric.231 
As importantly, Meese popularized originalist arguments, clearly 
connecting them to political results like the overruling of Roe. In a 
widely reported July 1985 speech, Meese endorsed an “endeavor to 
resurrect the original meaning of the Constitution.”232 He urged 
courts to focus on discerning the motives of the Constitution’s 
framers and, if necessary, looking to the history and context of 
particular constitutional provisions.233 In the Supreme Court, 
Meese’s Justice Department presented originalism as a solution for 
the problem identified by anti-abortion constitutionalists. In an 
amicus brief in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Meese’s Justice Department emphasized “[t]here is no 
explicit textual warrant in the Constitution for a right to an 
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abortion.”234 Roe, the brief contended, ignored the history of the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and the likely intentions of 
its Framers.235 The brief served as a reminder that any judge who 
prioritized the intentions of the Framers would overrule Roe. Meese 
also shared the commitment of abortion opponents and other 
grassroots activists to remaking the courts. At a time when Patrick 
McGuigan of the Free Congress Foundation and John Willke of the 
NRLC created projects to influence the Reagan Administration’s 
judicial nominations, Meese told the media that he hoped such 
nominations would be his greatest legacy as attorney general.236 
For abortion opponents, conservative originalism emerged as the 
basis for an attractive constitutional coalition that united legal 
theorists, Religious Rights champions, free-market advocates, and 
members of the Reagan Administration. Certainly, some members of 
this alliance deeply believed in the values of rule of law, judicial 
humility, neutrality, and deference to democratic majorities 
expressed by conservative originalists.237 For other members, 
however, conservative originalism did not perfectly reflect their 
constitutional beliefs. In particular, abortion opponents recognized 
that originalism would at most ensure that Roe was overruled. 
Originalist judges would be unlikely to recognize the existence of an 
implied right to life. Nonetheless, the concrete benefits of joining 
the originalist coalition were becoming evident. James McClellan put 
the point succinctly: “One or two more appointees to the Supreme 
Court, and one way or another, Roe v. Wade will fall.”238 
Anti-abortion constitutionalists’ interest in judicial nominations 
again increased in 1986, when the Court decided Thornburgh, 
striking down a multi-restriction Pennsylvania statute. When the 
Thornburgh Court again confirmed the validity of Roe, anti-abortion 
constitutionalists noted that only five Justices joined the majority 
opinion. Doug Johnson of the NRLC insisted, “We’re just one vote 
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away from a court which may be prepared to abandon Roe vs. 
Wade.”239 Willke simply stated, “It will take new people on the 
Court to make a difference.”240 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, some abortion opponents did not 
enthusiastically support the nomination of Robert Bork, a living 
symbol of originalism and a known opponent of Roe. Before his 
defeat, some abortion opponents still believed that Bork’s 
nomination and his promotion of originalism were “not [. . .] pro-
life issue[s].”241 With Bork’s failure, however, leading abortion 
opponents, Willke among them, began using originalist rhetoric as a 
rallying cry for the movement’s substantive demands. In defeat, Bork 
served as a reminder of the importance of federal court nominations. 
Abortion opponents set aside their foundational constitutional belief 
about the right to life in signing on to the originalist agenda. If 
originalist judges overruled Roe, the argument went, that was likely 
the best the anti-abortion movement could hope for. 
1. The lesson of Robert Bork 
Robert Bork, Reagan’s 1987 nominee to the Supreme Court, 
was the most visible originalist opponent of Roe. During the 1981 
hearing for his nomination to the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Bork stated: “I am convinced . . . that Roe v. Wade is an 
unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable judicial 
usurpation of state legislative authority.”242 
Although abortion opponents mobilized to support Bork, pro-
choice opposition to the nomination was more intense, sustained, 
and organized. At the July 1987 National Convention of the 
National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), the 
organization prioritized Bork’s defeat and distributed “Bork 
Busters” buttons to all attendees.243 Organizations like NARAL, the 
National Organization for Women, and the Planned Parenthood 
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Federation of America joined an alliance called the Block Bork 
Coalition, which was intended to derail the nomination.244 The 
Block Bork Coalition tested strategies designed to present Bork as an 
extremist. After conducting extensive focus group research in August 
1987, the Coalition developed “themes” and “talking points” 
memos that offered the broad outlines of a strategy to defeat Bork. 
The August “Themes Memo” contended that if Bork succeeded, 
particular political results would be guaranteed. He would “provide 
the decisive vote to turn back the clock for a number of decisions,” 
including those on abortion.245 
For its part, the Reagan administration framed the issue as 
“whether judges and the courts are called upon to interpret the 
laws . . . or whether judges and the courts should write orders and 
opinions which are, in effect, new law—the activist view.”246 Since 
1986, the administration had been concerned about what one 
Reagan aide described as “opposition efforts to position the federal 
courts as ‘the tool of the far right’ under Reagan.”247 In September 
1987, the administration responded that “[i]deology should have no 
part” in Bork’s hearings.248 
Abortion opponents endorsed Bork’s nomination. Doug 
Johnson of the NRLC explained, “We don’t know Bork’s views on 
abortion per se . . . . We support him on the basis of his judicial 
philosophy and his position on Roe.”249 Willke was much more 
insistent, writing in 1987 that the Bork nomination involved “the 
most crucial prolife [sic] vote in 14 years.”250 Abortion opponents 
held sporadic rallies in favor of the nomination, and attendees of the 
NRLC Convention applauded when a speaker predicted that Bork 
would soon join the Court.251 Generally, however, abortion 
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opponents were not fully convinced that Bork’s originalism was 
deserving of passionate support. As Kay C. James, the NRLC Public 
Affairs Director, explained after the failure of the Bork nomination: 
“The first time out you didn’t see the pressure or the wrath or 
intensity of the pro-life movement because we didn’t really see the 
Bork nomination as a pro-life issue.”252 
Ironically, it was the failure of Bork’s nomination that finally 
made originalism more alluring to pro-life constitutionalists. In 
attacking Bork, pro-choice advocates made it increasingly clear that 
he represented the vote that would overturn Roe. After his defeat 
was unavoidable, Bork publicly denounced Roe, attributing anti-
abortion “demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, [and] 
mass mailings” to the Roe Court’s activism.253 Because the Court 
had not relied on constitutional text or history, as Bork portrayed it, 
the Roe Court was “perceived, correctly, as political.”254 He 
described a threat to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and “integrity” 
that was no longer abstract but evident in social and political 
events.255 
Originalism still seemed unlikely to deliver the constitutional 
changes abortion opponents had long desired. The stated position of 
Bork and other originalists was not that the Constitution protected a 
right to life but rather that the Constitution did not protect a right 
to abortion. An originalist Court would overrule Roe and return the 
issue to democratic politics. From the standpoint of anti-abortion 
leaders, overruling Roe would be a tremendous achievement. Just the 
same, movement members had long condemned “states’ rights” 
amendments that would have once again made abortion an issue of 
ordinary politics. Anti-abortion constitutionalists deeply believed that 
the Constitution protected the right to life from the vicissitudes of 
popular politics. An originalist Court would leave the right to life 
vulnerable to public majorities in just the way abortion opponents 
had feared. 
Choosing to join the originalist coalition, then, involved a 
distinct set of tradeoffs. Endorsing originalism made abortion 
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opponents a part of an influential coalition with the power to shape 
nominations to the federal bench. If the movement could impact 
Supreme Court nominations, in turn, abortion opponents believed 
that they could rid themselves of Roe. In 1990, James Bopp, Jr., the 
general counsel for the NRLC, summarized the importance attached 
to the nomination process: “We’ve already won the war on 
abortion . . . . The only question, I suppose, is whether the decisions 
will be 5–4 or 6–3, and frankly, it doesn’t matter as long as you have 
a majority.”256 
Beginning in 1990, primarily for strategic reasons, anti-abortion 
leaders framed their constitutional vision as an originalist one, 
joining conservatives on the courts and in other movements. When 
Justice William Brennan retired from the Court in July 1990, for 
example, Burke Balch, the NRLC Legislative Director, stated the 
following: “We regret that Justice Brennan’s decisions in the area of 
abortion did not conform to the Constitution as it is written.”257 
Doug Johnson, another NRLC leader, agreed that Roe was “judicial 
legislation at its most extreme.”258 “Any justice who meets the 
president’s criteria of faithfulness to the real Constitution could not 
vote to reaffirm Roe v. Wade,” he asserted.259 
When President George H.W. Bush nominated David Souter to 
replace Brennan,260 Bopp explained that his colleagues were 
“pleased” that Bush had nominated “a justice who will interpret the 
Constitution according to its text.”261 Johnson similarly stated, “As 
far as we know, he has not expressed a judgment on abortion, but 
the president has described him as a strict constructionist . . . . We 
think Roe has no basis in the Constitution, so the appointment of a 
strict constructionist will construe the erosion of Roe.”262 
In the following years, Supreme Court nominations and the 
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movement’s ability to influence sitting Justices remained a priority 
for abortion opponents. By signing on to the conservative originalist 
agenda, abortion opponents made themselves part of a powerful 
coalition that included New Right attorneys, evangelical protestants, 
religious traditionalists, libertarians, and free-marketers. Originalist 
rhetoric allowed these groups to speak with a single voice. As 
importantly, conservative originalism proved to be an effective 
weapon in the struggle to build popular support. Because 
conservative originalism appeared neutral and committed to the rule 
of law, originalism also resonated with the broader public.  
Nevertheless, originalism remains only a second-best solution for 
abortion opponents—something signaled by activists’ ongoing, 
internal commitment to fetal rights approaches. In scholarship, pro-
lifers still sometimes play up the due-process and equal-protection 
arguments for fetal rights that once inspired the movement.263 In 
every election since 1987, abortion opponents have pushed a plank 
in the Republican Party platform endorsing a constitutional 
amendment protecting the fetus’s right to live.264 In anti-abortion 
publications, activists continue to argue for the existence of a 
fundamental right to life based on the Declaration of Independence 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.265 
In speaking to outsiders, however, members of the mainstream 
movement more often claim the mantle of a broader originalist 
cause. Americans United for Life has conducted and publicized polls 
to establish that “majorities of all parties oppose judicial activism” 
and favor the regulation of abortion.266 In 2012, the group hosted a 
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conference spotlighting the activism of Roe and its progeny, insisting 
that the abortion right “has no basis in the text, structure, or history 
of the Constitution.”267 The AUL has recently promoted a book, 
Abuse of Discretion, penned by organization leader Clarke Forsythe 
that highlights the Roe Court’s departure from original intent.268 As 
Forsythe contends: “At the core of Roe is not the Constitution, nor 
values deeply rooted in American history and culture, but a short-
sighted view of America and of human liberty.”269 Similarly, the 
National Right to Life Education Trust Fund, the public relations 
arm of the NRLC, continues to play up arguments that Roe counts 
as “an exercise of raw judicial power.”270 
Notwithstanding abortion opponents’ commitment to the 
originalist coalition, that dedication has not fully paid off. Roe has 
been weakened but remains good law. Nominees once thought to be 
originalists—Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Sandra Day 
O’Connor—have voted to preserve Roe.271 Any advance has come at 
significant cost. Conservative originalism constrains the way activists 
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describe their grievances and aspirations. Abortion opponents have 
downplayed arguments for a right to life that many activists still 
endorse, instead of prioritizing what are believed to be more 
immediately impactful originalist rhetoric. In the process, abortion 
opponents have done less to popularize the constitutional values 
central to the movement’s agenda: arguments about the humanity of 
the fetus and the constitutional pedigree of the right to life. Instead 
of building support for these constitutional commitments, 
movement members remade their arguments in order to fit the 
relatively narrow parameters of conservative originalist rhetoric. 
Rights talk has become famous for limiting social-movement 
members’ ability to articulate, demand, or build support for 
important forms of social change.272 As abortion opponents have 
realized all too well, originalism talk can be just as restrictive. 
IV. RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 
The evolution of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers valuable 
new perspective on theoretical and historical work on originalism. 
Historians describe conservative originalism as a site of mobilization 
for a wide range of right-leaning activists.273 Some of these 
movement members are seen to have responded to the values of 
judicial restraint and fidelity to the rule of law that first-generation 
originalist theorists articulated. Other activists supposedly viewed 
originalism as a perfect vehicle for guaranteeing conservative 
constitutional outcomes. 
However, by focusing on the benefits of originalism talk, current 
studies obscure its substantial costs for the social movements 
endorsing it. Scholars have long documented the difficulties faced by 
social movements forced to rely on law or the Constitution in 
demanding social change.274 When a movement focuses on litigation, 
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familiar forms and delimit[] their tactical options”); Robert Post, The Supreme Court 2002—
Foreword: Fashioning The Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
7 (2003) (offering an example of how rights talk can regulate and constrain politics, creating a 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 3:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
924 
activists have to use narrow, legalistic, and rights-based language that 
poorly captures the wide variety of grievances, aspirations, and beliefs 
of movements seeking to remake society.275 By turning to law, social 
movements often find themselves constrained. Of course, rights talk 
has also had tremendous value to social-change causes, moving new 
activists to action, legitimating movement demands, and framing 
them in a way that policymakers are more likely to dignify.276 Just 
the same, the story of rights talk is often one about the difficult 
choices made by social movements, especially when activists seek 
social change in the courts. 
So too is the history of originalism talk. In the story of anti-
abortion constitutionalism, originalism represented an imperfect 
strategic compromise. On the one hand, joining an originalist 
coalition allowed abortion opponents to make a difference in the 
selection of judicial nominees. Expressing the movement’s views in 
originalist terms made abortion opponents part of an influential and 
savvy constitutional coalition. Moreover, originalism allowed activists 
to speak in a way that made sense to legal and political elites and to 
formulate arguments in a way that the public was prepared to 
recognize as moderate, rational, and legal. Originalist rhetoric 
legitimated anti-abortion claims, lending them a legal and political 
respectability they might not otherwise have enjoyed. Signing on to 
the originalist agenda also had a significant mobilizing effect, 
providing much needed successes that sustained activists frustrated 
by the lack of progress the movement confronted in promoting a 
human life amendment. 
On the other hand, originalism talk constrained abortion 
opponents, putting off-limits many of the movement’s longstanding 
contentions about a constitutional right to life. Abortion opponents 
had to tailor their claims to fit an existing originalist framework. 
Activists used time, money, and energy to promote the idea of 
originalism that could have been used to popularize foundational 
beliefs about the fetus and its role in the American constitutional 
tradition. For this reason, originalist reasoning had significant 
opportunity costs. Abortion opponents could not as easily publicize 
 
body of law “categorically autonomous from the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors”). 
 275.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 276.  NeJaime, supra note 8, at 668. For more works in this vein, see, e.g., KORNBLUH, 
supra note 8; MACLEAN, supra note 8; Dinner, supra note 8, at 580. 
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their beliefs or demand that policymakers take those convictions 
seriously. Instead of seeking to change public attitudes about fetal 
life, the movement used scarce resources to publicize an interpretive 
method with no meaningful connection to activists’ constitutional 
commitments. 
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism also makes an 
important contribution to theoretical scholarship on originalism and 
its alternatives. Scholarly understandings of originalism as a political 
practice explore its appeal to both conservative social movements and 
to the general public. The attraction of originalism to movement 
conservatives seems obvious: originalism has proven to be a 
remarkably effect tool in the promotion of conservative values and 
outcomes. Progressive scholars seek to understand conservative 
originalism’s appeal in order to create a compelling theoretical 
alternative to it. 
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers a different 
perspective on what it would mean to create a successful progressive 
theory that would replicate the success of originalism. In the story of 
anti-abortion constitutionalism, originalism represented an imperfect 
tactical decision. Creating a progressive alternative to conservative 
originalism would involve a willingness to subordinate important 
goals, commitments, and arguments, in the name of short-term 
political gain. It is possible to imagine a progressive interpretive 
method that would approximate the ideal described by scholars—a 
method that would vindicate a social movement’s beliefs while 
appearing neutral to the public. The story of anti-abortion 
constitutionalism, however, makes clear that conservative originalism 
did not represent this ideal for some of those who endorsed it. To 
the extent that this history offers any example, creating a progressive 
alternative to conservative originalism would involve a tactical 
decision to set aside particular constitutional goals or arguments in 
order to forge an effective constitutional and political coalition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Conservative originalism has had considerable allure. It resonates 
with the public and has shaped the constitutional politics of several 
Republican administrations and sitting Justices. Since the 1980s, 
scholars have experimented with alternatives that would advance 
progressive commitments while respecting the will of the people and 
the rule of law. 
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However, social movement members and attorneys should not 
try to replicate the success of conservative originalism without 
understanding what it has meant to its constituents. For abortion 
opponents, the story of conservative originalism has been one of 
coalition-building, difficult constraints, and promises half-fulfilled. It 
is worth asking whether that is the kind of success social movements 
should pursue. 
